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INTRODUCTION
Since the United States began systematically to restrict exports
in peacetime for national security and foreign policy purposes,' foreign opposition to the extraterritorial reach of American export controls has been rife. 2 The Reagan Administration's efforts to delay
completion of the Soviet Union's natural gas pipeline to Western
Europe,3 however, have raised foreign concern over American
claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction to new heights. The jurisdictional reach of the Administration's pipeline sanctions was in several
respects unprecedented.4
The foreign response was similarly
unprecedented: both the British and French governments acted to
block the application of the American controls, while other European governments openly urged that the controls be defied.5 Given
the underlying realities of the international economy 6 and the
"dynamic of escalation"' 7 that some observers have discerned, there
is every reason to fear that similar confrontations, with all their
political and economic costs,8 will be played out in the future.
This Article argues that the current period of relative calm in
trans-Atlantic political relations 9 provides an unusual opportunity to
seek at least partial resolution of a jurisdictional controversy that has
split the United States and its major trading partners for over thirty
years. The Article does not attempt to analyze the principles and
1. See Berman & Garson, United States Export Controls-Past,PresentandFuture,
67 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 791-92 (1967).
2. See id. at 867-72.
3. For detailed summaries of the pipeline episode see 3 A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS ch. II, §§ 5.4-5.6 (2d

ed. 1983); Moyer & Mabry, Export Controlsas Instruments of ForeignPolicy: The History, LegalIssues, andPolicyLessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus.
1, 60-91 (1983).
4. See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 57-106 and accompanying text.
7. D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, NATIONAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE 83 (Chatham House Papers No. 17, 1982). On the issue of escalation, Rosenthal
and Knighton state:
The extraterritoriality problem is not increasing at a constant rate: there have
been periods of relative quiet in some, if not in all, of its aspects. But the trend
over the past 40 years has clearly been upward. And the escalation was more
rapid in the 1970s than the 1960s, and in the 1960s than the 1950s. And those
countries which see themselves as victims of extraterritoriality are becoming
more vigorous in their responses.
Id.
8. See infra notes 107-30 and accompanying text.
9. On issues other than extraterritoriality, of course, conflict between the United
States and its major trading partners has continued since the settlement of the pipeline
dispute. See, e.g., Vest, Brock Say U.S.-European Ties Weakest Since End of World War
II, 20 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY 159 (1983) (describing Senate testimony of U.S. Ambassador to the European Communities and U.S. Trade Representative on economic disputes
between United States and European Communities).
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precedents of international law on the reach of national jurisdiction.10 Rather, it argues for a practical solution to the dispute, centering on international negotiations. In particular, the Article
suggests that Congress could be an effective catalyst of such a dispute resolution process and outlines a course of action that Congress
might follow to perform this function.
Part I of the Article briefly recounts the facts of the pipeline
episode. Part II describes the economic foundations of the dispute

over extraterritoriality and explains why the dispute is likely to recur
unless remedial measures are taken. Part III analyzes the costs of
failing to resolve the dispute. Part IV examines the role that Congress will play in the resolution of the extraterritoriality controversy,

and considers several alternative courses of action for Congress.
Finally, Part V details the proposal for congressional action mentioned above, and suggests a number of jurisdictional formulations
that could serve as concrete bases for international negotiations.
I
THE PIPELINE EPISODE
On December 23, 1981, President Reagan condemned the impo-

sition of martial law in Poland and announced a program of economic sanctions against the Polish regime. I I Six days later, accusing
the Soviet Union of "heavy and direct responsibility for the repres-

sion in Poland," he instituted an even more potent set of sanctions,
including both trade and non-trade measures, against the Soviets.12
Export controls formed the centerpiece of the 1981 trade sanctions against the Soviet Union. First, the Department of Commerce

expanded existing controls by requiring validated licenses for
10. For discussions of the relevant principles and precedents as applied to trade controls, see Morse & Powers, U.S. Export Controls and ForeignEntities: The Unanswered
Questionsof PpeiineD4ilomacy, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 537 (1983); Thompson, UnitedStates
JurisdictionOver ForeignSubsidiaries: CorporateandinternationalLaw Aspects, 15 LAw
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 319 (1983); Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of the Export Administration Act of 1979 Under Internationaland American Law, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1308
(1983); Marcuss & Richard, ExtraterritorialJurisdictionin United States Trade Law: The
Needfor a Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 439 (1981).
11. Address to the Nation About Christmas and the Situation in Poland, 1981 PUB.
PAPERS 1185 (Dec. 23, 1981). In October 1982, Poland's most-favored-nation tariff status
also was withdrawn. Proclamation No. 4991, 3 C.F.R. 100 (1983).
12. Statement on U.S. Measures Taken Against the Soviet Union Concerning its
Involvement in Poland, 1981 PUB. PAPERS 1209 (Dec. 29, 1981). The non-trade measures
included revocation of the Soviet airline's landing rights in the United States, nonrenewal of U.S.-Soviet exchange agreements in the areas of science, technology, and
energy, and postponement of negotiations dealing with grain purchases. Id. Two
months later, the Administration also expanded certain prior controls on truck manufacturing equipment and technology. 47 Fed. Reg. 9201, 9203 (1982) (codified at 15 C.F.R.
§ 385.2(e)(1983)).
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exports from the United States to the Soviet Union of equipment
and related technical data used in the transmission and refining of
petroleum and natural gas.1 3 Previously, such equipment had been
eligible for export to the Soviet Union under general license; only
exploration and production equipment and related technical data
had required a validated license. 14 Second, the Department "suspended the processing of applications for validated licenses and
other authorizations for export," including reexport authorizations,
to the Soviet Union. 15 Moreover, it announced that all outstanding
licenses and authorizations were subject to review and possible sus13. 47 Fed. Reg. 141-43 (1982) (amending 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(c) and the Commodity
Control List, Supp. No. I to 15 C.F.R. § 399.1). The Department of Commerce summarized this regulation as follows:
Under current regulations, a validated export license is required for foreign policy purposes for the export to the U.S.S.R... . of specific oil and gas exploration and production equipment, and technical data related to oil and gas
exploration and production. This rule imposes new foreign policy controls on
exports to the U.S.S.R.. . . of commodities for transmission (including transportation) and refinement of petroleum or natural gas and technical data related to
oil and gas transmission or refinement. These controls also apply to
Afghanistan.
Presently, under 15 C.F.R. 385.2(c) the Department of Commerce controls
exports of specified oil and gas exploration and production equipment, technical
data.., related to oil and gas exploration and production, and other commodities that require a validated export license for shipment to the Soviet Union and
that are intended for use in oil or gas exploration or production. This rule
expands the existing controls by applying the controls to the areas of refinement
for energy usage and transmission.
Id. at 141.
Under the Export Administration Regulations, the export from the United States of all
commodities and all technical data is prohibited-with certain specified exceptionsunless (a) a general license authorizing the export in question has been established by the
Commerce Department's Office of Export Administration (OEA), or (b) a validated
license or other authorization for such export has been granted by the OEA. 15 C.F.R.
§ 370.3(a) (1983). A validated license is an actual document issued by the OEA to
authorize a specific transaction. Id. at § 372.2(a). A general license, by contrast, is an
authorization established by OEA regulation. Each general license may be used by any
person, except those disqualified on account of prior violations, for any transaction falling within its terms. No application is necessary and no document is issued. Id. at
§§ 370.2, 371.1.
14. See 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(c) (1983). Validated license requirements for exports of
petroleum and natural gas exploration and production equipment had been imposed as a
foreign policy measure in 1978. See Abbott, Linking Trade to PoliticalGoals: Foreign
Policy Export Controlsin the 1970s and 1980s, 65 MINN. L. REv. 739, 790-94 (1981).
15. 47 Fed. Reg. 144 (1982). The Department described this regulation as follows:
This issuance announces a General Order of the Department of Commerce suspending the processing of all licensing for exports to the U.S.S.R. to further U.S.
foreign policy objectives in light of the Soviet Union's heavy and direct responsibility for the repression in Poland. This issuance provides notice that no new
licenses or other authorizations for export to the U.S.S.R. will be issued by the
Department of Commerce. Outstanding validated licenses and authorizations
may be reviewed to determine whether suspension or revocation may be necessary to be consistent with the objectives of this action.
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pension or revocation. 16 This suspension order halted exports to the
Soviet Union of goods requiring a validated license, including the
contemporaneously controlled oil and gas transmission and refining
equipment. Because the transfer to the Soviet Union of nearly all
proprietary industrial technology already required a validated
license, 17 technology exports were almost completely prohibited.
The 1981 regulations, although not the focus of the subsequent
controversy, had certain extraterritorial effects. First, United States
suppliers could no longer export pipeline-related equipment to their
European and Japanese customers, or even to their own foreign affiliates, if they knew that it would be reexported to the Soviet Union.' 8
As a result, many foreign firms dependent on United States sources
for crucial components encountered difficulties fulfilling their contracts to supply finished products for use on the pipeline. For example, prior to the 1981 controls, the General Electric Company had
entered into "Manufacturing Associate Agreements" with several
European firms under which General Electric licensed its proprietary technology for the manufacture of turbine compressors, but
retained the technology for the manufacture of rotor assemblies necessary to the operation of the compressors.' 9 The Manufacturing
Associates had contracted to supply 125 compressors to the Soviet
Union, and General Electric appeared to be the only company manufacturing the rotors, but the 1981 regulations blocked export of
20
these crucial components.
Second, the regulations purported to restrain foreign firms from
reexporting 2 ' to the Soviet Union U.S.-origin products and technology used in the transmission and refining of petroleum and natural
16. Id. A license for at least one major transaction-the export by Caterpillar Tractor of 200 pipelayers-was actually revoked. See 3 A. LOWENFELD, supra note 3, at ch.
I, § 5.45.
17. Under 15 C.F.R. § 379.4(b) (1981), only a few types of transaction involving
exports to the Soviet Union of technical data qualified for General License GTDR, the
only general license available for exports of non-public industrial information.
18. See 15 C.F.R. § 374.1(b) (1981).
19. See Motion to Vacate Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges and Memorandum in Support at 3, In the Matter of John Brown Engineering Limited, Case No.
635, U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration (filed Oct. 1,
1982) [hereinafter cited as John Brown Memorandum].
20. See 3 A. LOWENEELD, supra note 3, at ch. II, §§ 5.44-.45. The effect of the blocking can be seen in the case of John Brown Engineering Limited, which had contracted to
supply twenty-one turbines of General Electric design for use in the pipeline, but had
only six rotor assemblies in inventory as of December 1981. See John Brown Memorandum, supra note 19, at 4-5.
21. Under the Export Administration Regulations, the term "reexport" includes
"reexport, transshipment, or diversion of commodities or technical data from one foreign
destination to another." 15 C.F.R. § 370.2 (1983).
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gas. 22 In the case of U.S.-origin end products, the Export Adminis-

tration Regulations made clear that the new reexport prohibition
applied even to products previously exported from the United
States 32 It was not clear, however, whether the same could be said
of U.S.-origin parts, components, and materials incorporated in end
products abroad, because of an ambiguity in the relevant regulations.24 The Manufacturing Associates of General Electric, which in
some cases had on hand a number of rotor assemblies previously
exported by General Electric under the relevant agreements, 25 were
thus unsure whether sales to the Soviet Union of compressors containing these particular rotors would constitute a violation of the
American embargo.
Finally, the 1981 regulations required, as a precondition for use
of the only general license available for exports of proprietary industrial technology, that importers of U.S.-origin technology relating to
oil and gas transmission and refining equipment in countries other
than the Soviet Union give "written assurances" to their suppliers in
the United States that such technology and its "direct products"
22. The reexport of goods previously exported from the United States is generally
prohibited under the Export Administration Regulations. See 15 C.F.R. § 374.1 (1981).
Reexports of products that, at the time of reexport, may be directly exported from the
United States to the new foreign destination under general license may, however, be
made without express Commerce Department authorization. 15 C.F.R. § 374.2(a)(1)
(1981). By requiring a validated license for exports of pipeline equipment from the
United States to the Soviet Union, the 1981 regulations made this exception to the
requirement of a reexport authorization inapplicable. Cf. 15 C.F.R. § 379.8(a)(1), (b)(1)
(1981) (parallel regulations concerning reexports of technical data).
23. Under the scheme described in note 22, supra, the availability of a permissive
exception to the requirement of a reexport authorization was to be judged "at the time of
reexport," 15 C.F.R. § 374.2(a) (1981), not at the time the goods were first exported from
the United States. See Address by John Ellicott, entitled ExtraterritorialTrade Confrols-Law, Policy andBusiness, presented to the Southwestern Legal Foundation Symposium on Private Investments Abroad, at 12-14 (June 14, 1983) (copy on file at offices of
the Cornell International Law Journal) (Address reprinted in PRIVATE INVESTMENTS
ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SoLuTioNs - (Sw. Legal Fdn. 1983) [hereinafter cited as
Ellicott]. Cf. 15 C.F.R. § 379.8(b)(1) (1981) (parallel provision on technical data
reexports).
24. The Export Administration Regulations include a provision pointing out that
parts, components, and materials are subject to the export control laws, and stating that
the Commerce Department "exercises vigilance over exports and reexports of these commodities. . . ." 15 C.F.R. § 376.12 (1981). A "Note" to this section lays out a procedure for determining whether United States approval is required for shipments of
foreign-produced end products containing such U.S.-origin items. The Note makes the
determination turn on the existence of a validated license requirement for shipments of
either the end products in question or the U.S.-origin components directly from the
United States to the new destination. The Note, as it stood in 1981, however, confused
the issue by stating the question as whether Commerce Department approval is required
"for the incorporationabroadof U.S.-origin parts or components in a foreign-made end
product that will be exported to another country .

. . ."

15 C.F.R. § 376.12 Note (1981)

(emphasis added). See Ellicott, supra note 23, at 14-16.
25. See John Brown Memorandum, supra note 19, at 4.
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would not be transferred to the Soviet Union. 26 Under a longstand-

ing provision of the Export Administration Regulations, the existence of a written assurances requirement made it unlawful for
foreign licensees of U.S.-origin oil and gas transmission and refining
technology to export the direct products of that technology to the

Soviet Union without Commerce Department approval. 27 This regulation, even more than that dealing with parts and components, was
ambiguous in its application to foreign holders of technology previously exported from the United States. 28 It seemed clear, however,
that the December 1981 regulations, like previous restrictions on foreign products of U.S.-origin technology, were only intended to apply
prospectively.29 Accordingly, the Manufacturing Associates of Gen-

eral Electric, in their capacity as licensees of General Electric compressor technology, were not affected by this aspect of the December

embargo because the relevant technology had been disclosed to them
well before the regulations became effective. 30 The 1981 controls
also did not reach the French firm Alsthom-Atlantique, the only

European manufacturer previously licensed to use General Electric's
31
rotor technology.
By June of 1982, with the severity of military rule in Poland
undiminished, 32 it had become clear that the December restrictions

were reaching only a limited part of the involvement of American
firms in the pipeline project. Therefore, on June 21, President Reagan announced that he had "reviewed the sanctions on the export of
oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union. . .and. . . decided to
extend these sanctions. . . to include equipment produced by sub-

sidiaries of U.S. companies abroad, as well as equipment produced
' '33
abroad under licenses issued by U.S. companies.
26. 47 Fed. Reg. 141-42 (1982) (amending 15 C.F.R. § 379.4(f)(1)(i)(p)).
27. See 15 C.F.R. § 379.8(a)(3) (1981).
28. 15 C.F.R. § 379.8(a)(3) (1981) prohibited the unauthorized export of any foreignproduced direct product of U.S.-origin technical data "if such direct product ... is covered by the provisions of § 379.4(f)," which require written assurances for certain technology exports. Id. The section does not specify, however, when the product must be
"covered" by § 379.4(f). Since § 379.4(f) requires written assurances at the time the technology is exported, the best interpretation would seem to be that new restrictions cannot
be imposed on foreign exports of direct products of previously exported U.S.-origin technology if no written assurance incorporating such restrictions was required when the
technology was first exported.
29. See 47 Fed. Reg. 141 (1982); Ellicott, supra note 23, at 8-11.
30. See, e.g., John Brown Memorandum, supra note 19, at 3-4.
31. See 3 A. LOWENFELD, supra note 3, at ch. II, §§ 5.45, 5.46, 5.5.
32. In his statement expanding the United States trade sanctions, President Reagan
noted that "[s]ince December 30, 1981, little has changed concerning the situation in
Poland; there has been no movement that would enable us to undertake positive, reciprocal measures." Statement on The Extension of United States Sanctions on the Export of
Oil and Gas Equipment to the Soviet Union, [1982] 1 Pun. PAPERS 798 (June 18, 1982).
33. Id.
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The implementing regulations embargoed exports to the Soviet
Union by foreign firms owned or controlled by U.S. individuals or
corporations, even if no U.S.-origin components or technology were
used. 34 In addition, the ambiguity in the Export Administration
Regulations pertaining to foreign exports of products containing
U.S.-origin parts, components, or materials-an issue of concern to
the General Electric Manufacturing Associates and to other firmswas resolved in favor of tighter controls. Such exports were prohibited, even if the U.S.-origin components had been exported prior to
December 1981, when no United States restrictions on exports or
35
reexports of oil and gas transmission equipment were in effect.

Finally, the similar temporal ambiguity pertaining to foreign
exports of the direct products of American technology also was
resolved in favor of tighter controls, although the clarification only
applied to exports of oil and gas equipment. 36 Such exports were to
be embargoed if any one of the following three conditions prevailed:
(1) if the foreign user of the technology had been required to give a
written assurance, at the time of the original technology transfer,
that it would not transfer the technology or any of its direct products
to the Soviet Union; (2) if the foreign user had agreed to abide by
United States export control regulations in a license agreement or
similar contract with its American supplier, even if the regulations in
effect at the time of the contract had not restricted sales of direct
products to the Soviet Union; or (3) if the technology was the subject
of a licensing agreement with an American firm or other "person
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," or--even in the
absence of such an agreement-if its use was contingent on the payment of royalties or other compensation to such a person, "regardless of when the [technology was] exported from the U.S. ...
Because the third condition covered virtually all commercial technology transfers, the first two were largely superfluous.
American trading partners reacted quite differently to the 1981
and 1982 regulations. Many European nations, such as Great Britain and France, had joined the United States in condemning the
34. 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250, 27,252 (1982) (amending 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(c)).
35. See id. at 27,251 (amending 15 C.F.R. § 376.12 Note).
36. See id. (adding 15 C.F.R. § 379.8(a)(4)).
37. Id. The first condition was in effect the same as the requirement added in
December 1981, see supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text, and affected few if any
transactions. The second condition seemed designed specifically for the case of AlsthomAtlantique, supra note 31 and accompanying text. See 3 A. LOWENFELD, supra note 3, at
ch. II, § 5.5. According to the Wall Street Journal, the license agreement between General Electric and Alsthom-Atlantique provided: "Alsthom further undertakes to keep
itself fully informed of the regulations (including amendments and changes thereto) and
agrees to comply therewith." Wall St. J., July 23, 1982, at 16, col. 1.
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imposition of martial law in Poland.38 While these nations were
unwilling in 1981 to impose economic sanctions except as a joint
action of the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) or the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.), 39 they essentially agreed
not to undercut the initial sanctions imposed by the United States.
In a January 1982 communique, for example, the foreign ministers
of the E.E.C. stated:
The Ten have taken note of the economic measures taken by the United
States government with regard to the U.S.S.R. The Ten will undertake in
this context close and positive consultation with the United States government and with the governments of other Western states in order to define
what decisions will best serve their common objectives
and to avoid any step
40
which could compromise their respective actions.

When the June 1982 regulations were promulgated, however,
foreign reaction was sharp and hostile. The E.E.C. and its member

states, as well as Japan, openly denounced the new measures and
issued diplomatic protests accompanied by detailed legal argument.41 These governments expressed three principal criticisms.
First, they felt that the United States had failed to consult adequately with them before taking an important action likely to have a
major impact on their economies. Second, they asserted that the
Reagan Administration had disregarded their views on the risks and
benefits of the pipeline and on the proper conduct of East-West rela-

tions. Finally, they argued that the American assertion of jurisdiction to regulate transactions taking place on foreign soil had gone
42
beyond the limits of comity and international law.
U.S. relations with Europe quickly deteriorated. The animosity
created by the pipeline episode began to affect negotiations concerning defense and unrelated economic matters. 43 The governments of

Europe, moreover, moved to block the American controls.
38. 3 A. LOWENFELD, supra note 3, at ch. II, § 5.45.
39. See id.
40. Communiqu6 on Poland issued by the Foreign Ministers of the European Economic Community, Jan. 4, 1982, reprintedin N.Y.. Times, Jan. 5, 1982, at A7, col. 3.
41. See, e.g., Comments of the European Community on the Amendments of 22
June 1982 to the U.S. Export Administration Regulations, reprinted in U.S. EXPORT
WEEKLY No. 420, at 717 (Aug. 17, 1982) [hereinafter cited as EEC Comments]; Statement of the Foreign Ministers of the European Economic Community (June 23, 1982),
quoted in N.Y. Times, June 24, 1982, § 1, at I, col. 5 ("[the Reagan Administration's
action,] taken without consultation with the Community, implies an extraterritorial
extension of U.S. jurisdiction, which in the circumstances is contrary to the principles of
international law.").
42. See European Community Callsfor Removal of U.S. Sanctions on Soviet Ppeline,
U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY No. 420, at 697-99; EEC Comments, supra note 41, at 717-22.
43. See, e.g., Allies' Poeline Discord Could Hinder Progress on Defense and Trade,
Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 1982, at 1, col. 6; Disputes Strain the Alantic Alliance, Wash. Post,
Aug. 8, 1982, at Al, col. 1;Europe Gets Ready to StrikeBack, Bus. WK., July 19, 1982, at
50.
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The British Secretary of State for Trade ruled that the June
1982 regulations were damaging the trading interests of the United

Kingdom 44 within the meaning of the Protection of Trading Interests
Act, 1980. 4 5 A month later, after British diplomatic efforts to reverse
the June regulations had failed, the Secretary invoked the Act to

order certain British companies not to comply with the American
sanctions."

The French government also ordered firms operating

within its borders-including Dresser (France), a subsidiary of the
American firm Dresser Industries-to fulfill contracts with the

Soviet Union. 47 The Italian and West German governments, while
refraining from ordering performance, urged their firms to honor
48

existing agreements.
The U.S. government, of course, did not passively accept this
interference with its embargo. As each European licensee and sub-

sidiary shipped controlled pipeline equipment, the Commerce
Department issued ex parte temporary denial orders suspending the

firm's "privilege" of participating in future transactions involving
the export of oil and gas equipment and related technology from the

for
United States, and revoking any outstanding validated licenses
49
the export of such goods and technology held by the flrm.

These actions resulted in a temporary standoff-European firms
were able to make initial deliveries under their pipeline contracts,
but suffered damaging penalties that interfered with their perform-

ance of unrelated contracts and their ability to attract new orders.50
Several firms, including Dresser (France) and the General Electric
44. The Protection of Trading Interests (U.S. Reexport Control) Order 1982,
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 852 (1982).
45. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 834
(1982). According to its preamble, the Act is intended "to provide protection from
requirements, prohibitions and judgments imposed or given under the laws of countries
outside the United Kingdom and affecting the trading or other interests of persons in the
United Kingdom." 21 I.L.M. at 834.
46. American Measures Against the Soviet Union: Protection of Trading Interests
Act, Statement by Secretary of State for Trade, Lord Cockfield (Aug. 2, 1982) reprintedin
21 I.L.M. 851.
47. See 3 A. LOWENFELD, supra note 3, at ch. II, § 5.46. The French government
stated that "[t]he contracts concluded by the French companies for the pipeline must be
honored." N.Y. Times, July 23, 1982, at Al, col. 6. It also ordered specific firms to fulfill
contracts. For example, it served Dresser (France) with a Requisition Order for Services
(Ordre de Requisition de Services), obligating the firm to fulfill specified contracts for the
delivery of compressors. See Ordre de Requisition de Services (Aug. 23, 1982), reprinted
in Motion to Vacate Temporary Denial of Export Privileges and Memorandum in Support at Attachment E, In the Matter of Dresser (France) S.A., Case No. 632, U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration [hereinafter cited as Dresser
Memorandum].
48. See N.Y. Times, July 25, 1982, § 1, at 1,col. 3 (describes Italian response); Wash.
Post, July 14, 1982, at Al, col. I (describes German response).
49. See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 3, at 72.
50. See, e.g., John Brown Memorandum, supra note 19, at 33-35.
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Manufacturing Associates, challenged the denial orders and other
penalties in administrative proceedings and in federal court.5 1 They

typically argued that the suspension of export privileges without a
hearing violated due process 52 and that the June regulations

exceeded the authority granted the President by the statute and violated international law because of their retroactive effects and their

application to foreign corporations.5 3 These attacks, and an effort in
54
Congress to terminate the pipeline controls, were unsuccessful.
The standoff ended on November 13, 1982, when President
Reagan terminated both the 1981 and 1982 pipeline controls.5 5 The
President stated that he was lifting the sanctions because of the "sub-

stantial agreement" reached between the United States and its trad56
ing partners on trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

II
THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE DISPUTE OVER
EXTRATERRITORIALITY

The pipeline episode is merely the most dramatic international
confrontation over the extraterritorial application of American
57
export controls; it is not the first. Since World War II, Canada,
51. See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 3, at 72-73 (describes challenges to the denial
orders and other penalties).
52. See Morse & Powers, supra note 10, at 543 n.26.
53. See id. at 543-44; Moyer & Mabry, supra note 3, at 72-73. The international law
argument was that the Export Administration Act should be interpreted as delegating the
power to control only such transactions as were within the jurisdiction of the United
States under international law. See Morse & Powers, supra note 10, at 557-58.
54. See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 3, at 73. A court in the Netherlands, however,
did hold the June 1982 regulations invalid under international law as applied to a foreign
subsidiary of an American firm. Judgment of Sept. 17, 1982, Arondissementsrechtbank,
Hague, Weekblad van het Recht [W. No.] 82/716, reprintedin 22 I.L.M. 66 (1983) (Compagnie Europeene des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V.). See 77 AM. J. INT'L L.
636 (1983).
55. See East-West Trade Relations and the Soviet Pipeline Sanctions, 18 WEEKLY
CoMP. PREs. Doc. 1475 (Nov. 13, 1982) [hereinafter cited as East-West Trade Relations].
The Commerce Department soon vacated the related denial orders. See generally Moyer
& Mabry, supra note 3, at 83-85.
56. East-West Trade Relations, supra note 55, at 1476. See also Moyer & Mabry,
supra note 3, at 85; Reagan Lifts the Sanctions on Salesfor Soviet Pieline, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 14, 1982, § 1, at 1, col. 6. The Europeans, however, particularly the French, disputed the existence of any agreement. See Few New Promisesin Pact with U.S., Europeans Contend, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1982, § 1, at 1, col. 6; France Disavows AlliedAcabrd
on Trade Cited by Reagan in Lifing P7pelineBan, Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1982, at 32, col. 2.
57. For a discussion of Canada's response to extraterritorial American regulation, see
Corcoran, The Trading With the Enemy Act and the ControlledCanadian Corporation, 14
McGILL LJ. 174 (1968). One of the most publicized disputes occurred in 1958 when the
United States Treasury Department, relying on regulations promulgated under the thencurrent version of the Trading with the Enemy Act, ordered Ford Motor Company to
instruct its Canadian subsidiary not to sell 1000 vehicles to the People's Republic of
China. Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, ch. 106,40 Stat. 411 (codified as amended
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France, 58 Britain,5 9 and other important trading partners have vigorously opposed the extraterritorial reach of American export restrictions through diplomatic and legal means. Even the extraterritorial
aspects of American controls on exports to the Soviet Union of mili-

tarily useful goods and technology--controls accepted in principle
and administered cooperatively by our allies-have led to sustained
irritation in Europe.60
Why has the extraterritorial reach of American export controls
become such a recurring source of conflict between the United States

and its trading partners? The most important reason is simply the
increasing frequency with which the United States has come to rely

on export controls, often including an extraterritorial element, as
instruments of its foreign policy.6 ' More specifically, however,
extraterritorial regulation has become a recurrent problem because it
reflects a fundamental economic phenomenon of the postwar

years-the internationalization of major industrial sectors. I do not
at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). Canadians believed that the application of American embargo regulations to foreign subsidiaries was particularly harsh in
their case because U.S.-based firms controlled virtually all of Canada's automotive
industry. The Canadian House of Commons hotly debated the Treasury's actions, and
soon thereafter Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker personally discussed the issue
with President Eisenhower, reaching agreement on case by case consultations. See 3 A.
LOWENFELD, supra note 3, at 101-02; Marcuss & Richard, supra note 10, at 467-68.
58. See, e.g., Judgment of May 22, 1965, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1968 Dalloz-Sirey,
Jurisprudence[D.S. Jur.] 147, reprintedin 5 I.L.M. 476 (1966) (Fruehauf Corp. v. Massardy). In Fruehauf,a majority-owned French subsidiary of an American corporation
contracted to supply semi-trailers to a French truck company, Berliet. The trailers,
together with tractors manufactured by Berliet, were to be sold to the People's Republic
of China. Under the Trading with the Enemy Act, the Treasury Department ordered the
American parent corporation to direct its subsidiary to cancel the contract. Berliet
refused to terminate the agreement amicably and threatened to sue for breach of contract. The minority French directors of the subsidiary then sued the American directors
and the American parent in the local commercial court, seeking the appointment of a
temporary administrator who would assume control of the company and execute the
contract. The court agreed to appoint an administrator, and its ruling was upheld on
appeal by the Court of Appeals of Paris. In this case, the American authorities did not
impose penalties on the Fruehauf firm. See generaly Craig, Application of the Trading
with the Enemy Act to ForeignCorporationsOwned by Americans: Reections on Fruehauf
v. Massardy, 83 HARV. L. Rnv. 579 (1970).
59. In the early 1960's, for example, a British construction firm desired to bid on a
project in Poland. The firm had licensed from American companies a number of techniques it planned to use in the Polish project. After consultation with its government, the
American licensor told the British firm that use of the know-how in Poland would violate
its license and would subject both firms to penalties under the then-current Export Control Regulations. Prime Minister MacMillan personally protested to President Kennedy.
See 3 A. LOWENFELD, supra note 3, at ch. I, § 3.27.
60. See Abbott, supra note 14, at 840; D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHrToN, supra note 7,
at 61; Ellicott, Trends in Export Regulation, 38 Bus. LAW. 533, 550-53 (1983).
61. For a demonstration of the increased use of export regulations for foreign policy
purposes, see C. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTr, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF FOREIGN POLICY GOALS (1983). See also Abbott, supra note 14, at 756-98; Moyer & Mabry,
supra note 3, at 4-6.
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refer here to the increasingly sophisticated manufacturing capabilities of wholly foreign firms, although this form of internationalization is highly relevant to export control policy.62 Rather, I refer to
the fact that many important industries-the pipeline episode has
shown the energy industry to be an excellent example-have come to
be characterized by a multiplicity of well-established business networks linking firms in different countries. These networks take three
principal (though interrelated) forms: international trading networks, technology transfer networks, and investment networks.
American export controls have become enmeshed in all three.
A.

INTERNATIONAL TRADING NETWORKS

Trade among the industrialized nations has grown prodigiously
in recent years. 63 United States exports have shared in this growth,
both in absolute terms and on a per capita basis. 64 American exports
have also changed in composition, undergoing a secular shift toward
finished products that require large amounts of capital. 65 Moreover,
even though foreign firms have been developing their technology
and manufacturing capabilities quite rapidly, the United States
remains the preferred or sole source for sophisticated components
and services in a number of important sectors, including the energy
industry.66 U.S.-origin goods thus flow along vast networks of international trade.
The United States has correctly perceived that these trading networks can threaten the effectiveness of unilateral export controls.
Without widespread international cooperation in a program of economic sanctions, foreign buyers of U.S.-origin goods are in a position to supply those goods to any target of American controls in
direct substitution for restricted American exports. To avoid this
result, the United States has long asserted the right to regulate not
only exports from its territory but also reexports of goods shipped
62. The ability of foreign firms to supply products and technology that can be substituted for those of U.S. origin ("foreign availability") decreases the United States' ability
to impose effective unilateral economic sanctions. See Abbott, supra note 14, at 800-10.
63. See BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF

THE UNITED STATES 846-49 (102d ed. 1981). Between 1965 and 1980, merchandise
exports of the developed countries increased from $18.3 billion to over $130 billion. In
the same period, developed country imports increased from $14 billion to over $125 billion. Id. at 846.
64. See id. at 843. From 1960 to 1980, United States merchandise exports rose from
$20.6 billion to $220.7 billion; the per capita increase was from $113 to $956. Id.
65. F. ROOT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 19-20 (4th ed. 1978).
66. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE U.S., TECHNOLOGY & SOVIET ENERGY AVAILABILITY 204 (1981) (listing items of oil and gas equip-

ment "which are either solely available from the United States or for which the United
States is generally considered a preferred supplier") [hereinafter cited as OTA REPORT].
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abroad. 67 As already seen, reexport controls apply to U.S.-origin

parts, components, and materials, as well as to finished goods, so that
U.S. controls can apply to foreign-manufactured end products incorporating a U.S.-origin component. 68 In the cases both of end prod-

ucts and of parts, components, and materials, the United States even
has asserted the right to impose new restrictions on the disposition of
U.S.-origin goods after they have left the United States, 69 a jurisdictional claim made necessary in part by rapid changes in substantive
70
foreign policy.
B.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER NETWORKS

Rather than exporting their products, American manufacturers
often find it advantageous to engage in foreign-based production.
While this can be accomplished in several ways, 7 1 many firms choose

to transfer elements of their technology and "know-how" abroad
through inter-firm or market transactions, typically licenses of tech-

nology. Licensing is often the first approach to foreign production
taken by a U.S. manufacturer. 72 It is a particularly attractive alternative for small firms and those inexperienced in international business because it requires little capital investment and places no
67. 15 C.F.R. § 374.1 (1983). See supra notes 21-25 & 35 and accompanying text.
The justification for reexport controls under international law has not in the past been
clear. See Abbott, supra note 14, at 842-43. In the litigation commenced by Dresser
(France), see supra note 51 and accompanying text, the Department of Commerce argued
that reexport controls are conditions imposed by the United States on the right to remove
goods or technology from its territory, explicitly or implicitly agreed to by the foreign
importer, and are thus consistent with the territoriality principle of international law.
See Post-Hearing Brief of U.S. Department of Commerce at 48-50, In the Matter of
Dresser (France) S.A., Case No. 632, U.S. Department of Commerce, International
Trade Administration.
68. 15 C.F.R. § 376.12 (1983). See supra notes 24 & 35 and accompanying text;
Debevoise, Trade Restraints-The Legal-PoliticalDichotomy, 14 TOLEDO L. Rv. 1299,
1320-21 (1983).
69. See supra notes 23-24 & 35 and accompanying text. Whether such restrictions
are proper is "a fundamental legal question left unresolved by the pipeline controversy
.... " Morse & Powers, supra note 10, at 537. The Commerce Department's argument
based on consent to a condition, see supra note 67, must depend in this case upon consent
to a general condition permitting subsequent imposition of restrictions. This argument
has been strongly criticized. See Morse & Powers, supra note 10, at 549 n.52. In addition, the actual "conditions" in the Export Administration Regulations were in some
cases ambiguous. See supra notes 24 & 35 and accompanying text; infra notes 83-87 and
accompanying text. Whether private agreement to such conditions can create national
jurisdiction under international law also has been questioned. See EEC Comments,
supra note 41, at 719; Morse & Powers, supra note 10, at 562-63.
70. On the unpredictability of foreign policy export controls, see Abbott, supra note
14, at 831-37.
71. See F. RooT, supra note 65, at 473.
72. I1d.
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physical assets at risk abroad.73 Even multinational firms that invest
directly in overseas production facilities often continue to license
their technology, but in these cases the licenses typically run to foreign affiliates or joint ventures rather than to independent foreign
firms.74 In all, licensing constitutes a significant proportion of all
transactions by American firms relating to foreign production, with
the licensees located overwhelmingly in the industrialized nations.75
Transnational business relationships based upon technology
transfers permeate virtually all leading industries. 76 After an intensive study of the world energy industry, for example, the United
States Office of Technology Assessment concluded:
Transfers of technology between U.S. firms and other Western concerns have
taken place in nearly all of the key technological areas of the oil and gas
industry....
The result of these transfers has been to significantly reduce
77
the number of areas in which the United States is a sole source of supply.

Without governmental restrictions, foreign users of U.S.-origin technology can, to the extent permitted by their license agreements,
retransfer the technology itself to countries that are targets of U.S.
export controls. As the quotation above indicates, however, foreign
licensees can also supply goods produced with the aid of the technology to target countries, thus effectively supplanting U.S.-based
exporters constrained by the controls.
The United States has attempted to deal with technology transfer networks in several ways. Under the Export Administration Regulations, reexport controls apply to retransfers of technology as well
as transshipments of goods. 78 The regulations also extend the concept of reexport to encompass foreign exports of goods that are products of U.S.-origin technology, even where the goods are
73. Id Cf. D. EITEMAN & A. STONEHILL, MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS FINANCE 215
(2d ed. 1979).
74. D. ErrEMAN & A. STONEHILL, supra note 73, at 215.
75. See F. RooT, supra note 65, at 480.
76. Cf. R. CAVEs & R. JONES, WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS 158 (3d ed. 1981).
Caves and Jones state: "There is a fast-improving international market in proprietary
technology, whereby new industrial knowledge is licensed between independent firms or
transferred administratively within multinational companies." Id. Caves and Jones suggest that this development contributes to loss of U.S. competitiveness in high-technology
products. .d. at 158-59.
77. OTA REPORT, supra note 66, at 201. The report continues:
Transfers of technology have affected the position of the United States as sole
source in two ways. An initial technology transfer spreads U.S. know-how
throughout the world. Once a foreign concern acquires a technological base, it
can expand upon this base and develop similar product lines on its own.
Id.
78. See 15 C.F.R. § 379.8(a)(l)-8(a)(2) (1983). This portion of the regulation states:
(a) Prohibitedexports and reexports.
Unless specifically authorized by the Office of Export Administration, or otherwise authorized under the provisions of paragraph (b) of this section, no person
in the United States or in a foreign country may:
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manufactured abroad using foreign-source materials. 79 In most
cases, the United States has sought only to regulate "direct products"

of U.S.-origin technology. When the direct product is a manufacturing facility, however, the United States has extended its restrictions

to the goods produced in the facility.8 0 This was the extent of the
June 1982 product of technology restrictions, aimed particularly at

the European licensees of General Electric's turbine technology and
at Alsthom-Atlantique, the licensee of its rotor technology. 8 1 In at

least one case, however, the United States has gone one step further,
products" of the
restricting foreign sales of so-called "subsequent
82
technology.
"direct products" of U.S.-origin
The unprecedented feature of the 1982 product of technology
controls was their retroactivity, the result of an abrupt change in for-

eign policy following the widespread licensing of previously
unrestricted technologies. Since 1964, foreign licensees of technolo(1) Reexport any technical data imported from the United States, directly or
indirectly, in whole or in part, from the authorized country(ies) of ultimate destination; [or]
(2) Export any technical data from the United States with the knowledge
that it is to be reexported, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, from the
authorized country(ies) of ultimate destination;
Id See also 15 C.F.R. § 379.8(b) (1983) (authorizes reexports of technology which, at the
time of reexport, could be exported from United States to a new destination under general license).
79. See 15 C.F.R. § 379.8(a)(3) (1983). This section provides that no person in the
United States or in a foreign country may:
Export or reexport to Country Group P, Q, W, Y, Z or Afghanistan any foreign
produced direct product of U.S. technical data, or any commodity produced by
any plant or major component thereof that is a direct product of U.S. technical
data, if such direct product or commodity is covered by the provisions of
§ 379.4(t) or § 379.5(e)(1) or (2) ....
Id. Country groups are defined in 15 C.F.R. pt. 370, Supp. No. 1 (1983).
In 1964, the United States began to restrict sales by foreign firms of products incorporating U.S.-origin technology to a significant degree. From that year until 1978, these
restrictions were imposed only for national security reasons. See Ellicott, supra note 23,
at 8-11. In 1978, however, the United States instituted two sets of foreign policy export
controls that involved restrictions on the transfer of products of U.S.-origin technology:
(1) as part of an embargo on exports to the South African military and police, see Abbott,
supra note 14, at 782-87, the United States sought to prevent private South African firms
licensed to use U.S.-origin technology from selling the products of such technology to the
embargoed organizations. See 43 Fed. Reg. 7311, 7311-15 (1978) (codified as amended .
at 15 C.F.R. §§ 379.4(3), 385.4(a)(3) (1983)); (2) as part of the 1978 controls on exports of
petroleum exploration and production equipment to the Soviet Union, see Abbott, supra
note 14, at 790-94, third country licensees of U.S.-origin technology in the regulated
areas were prohibited from exporting direct products of the technology to the Soviets.
See 43 Fed. Reg. 33,699-701 (1978) (amending 15 C.F.R. § 379.4(f) and the Commodity
Control List, Supp. No. 1 to 15 C.F.R. § 399.1).
80. See 15 C.F.R. § 379.8(a)(3) (1983).
81. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
82. See 15 C.F.R. § 379.4(e) (1981) (technical data restrictions applicable to South
Africa and Namibia). In 1982, the reference to subsequent products was deleted. See 47
Fed. Reg. 9201, 9202 (1982).
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gies used to produce controlled products had been required to give

written assurances that they would not transfer these products to
proscribed destinations. 83 The Department of Commerce would not

approve the export of the technologies until such assurances had

been received. 84 Restrictions on foreign exports of the products of
such technologies were only imposed in cases where such assurances

had been given. 85 Thus, product of technology controls prior to
1982-including the December 1981 pipeline regulations 86 -were
prospective and to some degree consensual. The 1982 pipeline regu-

lations, in contrast, applied to foreign licensees that had never given
a written assurance and had acquired U.S.-origin technology at a
time when no U.S. regulation restricted the disposition of products
87
of the technology.
C.

INVESTMENT NETWORKS

Large networks of foreign direct investment first appeared in
the decade after World War II, when U.S.-based multinational
enterprises 88 began a period of vigorous expansion. Although some

United States and foreign firms had established foreign operations
before the war, the explosive growth of the multinational enterprise

(MNE) has been a post-war, American phenomenon. 89 Today,
MNEs dominate most of the important industries in the interna-

tional economy.90 This is notably the case in the petroleum industry,

83. See 29 Fed. Reg. 3421, 3422 (1964); Ellicott, supra note 23, at 8-9. The current
written assurances requirements can be found at 15 C.F.R. §§ 379.4(0, 379.5(e) (1983).
84. See Ellicott, supra note 23, at 9.
85. Id. The current restriction on foreign sales of products of U.S.-origin technology
can be found at 15 C.F.R. § 379.8(a)(3) (1983).
86. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. In 1980, for example, General
Electric Company had received a formal advisory opinion from the Department of Commerce to the effect that heavy duty gas turbines could be shipped to the Soviet Union
under general license. See John Brown Memorandum, supra note 19, at 4-5 and Exhibit
2.
88. See F. ROOT, supra note 65, at 471-501 (detailed description of multinational
enterprises). According to Root,
A multinational enterprise denotes a headquarters or parent company that:
I. Engages in foreign production and other activities through its own affiliates located in several different countries.
2. Exercises direct control over the policies of those affiliates.
3. Strives to design and implement business strategies in production, marketing, finance, and other functions that transcend national boundaries, becoming
thereby progressively more geocentric in outlook.
Id. at 484-85.
89. Id. at 477. See generally Vagts, The MultinationalEnterprise: A New Challenge
for TransnationalLaw, 83 HARv. L. REv. 739, 746 (1970).
90. See D. EITEMAN & A. STONEHILL, supra note 73, at 12-19; 2 A. LOWENFELD,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE INVESTMENT 1-5 (2d ed.
1982).
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where the "first true multinationals" emerged. 9 1
An MNE establishes foreign production facilities by transferring its technology, 92 capital, 93 and organizational skill94 abroad in
intrafirm transactions, primarily the establishment or acquisition of
foreign subsidiaries. 95 Subsidiaries are for the most part incorporated in the nations where they will conduct most of their operations. 96 Indeed, the host nation may require local incorporation in
order to bolster its claim to control. 97 Nonetheless, the United States
parent company retains ultimate control of the subsidiary by virtue
of its significant, often complete, ownership of the foreign company's
stock.
In many cases, control by the parent is more direct and immediate. The typical MNE operates a world-wide system of subsidiaries
and other affiliates as an integrated unit, aiming to maximize the
returns of the entire system. 98 Executives of the parent in such an
MNE system may closely monitor and direct the daily activities of
the foreign affiliates.
Depending upon the degree of coordination maintained within
an MNE system, the relationships among the parent and its foreign
affiliates may involve frequent transfers of goods, capital, personnel,
and information.99 Many foreign subsidiaries purchase products and
components from the parent or from corporate siblings while exporting goods to other members of the corporate family.1 °0 The companies in an MNE system also engage in frequent transfers of
technology running primarily from parent to subsidiary.' 0 ' Dresser
(France), for example, claimed that its manufacturing operations in
France depended upon a constant, even daily, flow of technical
information from other parts of the Dresser system.10 2 In sum, in the
MNE the three principal forms of international business network are
frequently conjoined.
Each subsidiary in an MNE system, if it possesses the necessary
capital and technology, can substitute its production for that of its
parent or any sibling corporation in the United States, thereby
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

OTA REPORT, supra note 66, at 201.
See F. ROOT, supra note 65, at 494-98.
Id. at 490-94.
Id. at 498-500.
Vagts, supra note 89, at 742-43.
Id. at 742.

97. 2 J. ATwOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD

§ 18.24 (2d ed. 1981).
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See D. EITEMAN & A. STONEHILL, supra note 73, at 2.
See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
See F. RooT, supra note 65, at 487-90.
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
See Dresser Memorandum, supra note 47, at 11.
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reducing the effectiveness of unilateral American export controls in

much the same way as an independent foreign firm.103 In addition,
however, the MNE poses a unique challenge for American regulation because the parent corporation, which controls the entire sys-

tem, can in theory at least assign the manufacture of politically
sensitive products, or even the filling of particular orders for such

products, to a foreign affiliate in a country not likely to cooperate in
economic sanctions, thus escaping the reach of American export controls. To deal with these challenges, the United States has-in the
pipeline case and on other occasions-felt it necessary to extend the

reach of its regulations to cover transactions by foreign subsidiaries
and other affiliates. 104
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NETWORKS
Whenever the United States imposes unilateral export controls,

its officials face an almost irresistible temptation to bring one or
more of these networks, or at least those branches that originate in
the United States, within the ambit of American regulation. 0 5 But

the almost certain persistence of the international networks
described above-taken with the possible development of new networks, based on such transactions as leasing' 06-virtually guarantees
that without creative attention, extraterritorial export controls will
continue to be a significant problem in the international relations of
the United States.
103. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
104. In addition to cases arising under the Trading With the Enemy Act, see supra
notes 57-58, the 1979 freeze on official Iranian assets in American banks, imposed under
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. V
1981), was extended to the foreign branches and subsidiaries of the American banks. See
31 C.F.R. § 535.329 (1980). The funds held by the foreign branches were subsequently
transferred to the account of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at the Bank of
England, for disposition under the accords reached between Iran and the United States.
Exec. Order No. 12278, 3 C.F.R. 107 (1982). See generally 3 A. LOWENFELD, supra note
3, at ch. V, §§ 1-4.2; Carswell, Economic Sanctions and the IranExperience, 60 FOREIGN
AFF. 247 (Winter 1981-82).
105. On occasion, the United States has resisted the temptation, in particular by
refraining from the regulation of foreign subsidiaries. See Abbott, supra note 14, at 84549.
106. See Computer exportersplay war games with America's generals, ECONOMIST,
Feb. 25-Mar. 2, 1984, at 61 (describing restrictions placed on British lessees of IBM computer systems).
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III
THE COSTS OF EXTRATERRITORIAL EXPORT
CONTROLS
Extraterritorial export controls create political and economic
costs both for the nation imposing them and for affected third countries, and tend to reduce world economic welfare. 10 7 These costs will
be incurred as long as the United States continues to claim an extensive jurisdictional reach for its trade controls and foreign firms and
governments continue to oppose its claims as improper.
A.

POLITICAL COSTS

The political costs associated with extraterritorial export controls result from strains placed on relationships with third countries
that play host to portions of trade, technology transfer, and investment networks originating in the United States. To understand the
strength of the resentment such controls can engender, it is necessary
first to realize that a transaction based on such a network may be
perceived quite differently abroad than in Washington. What
appears to the government of the United States as a reexport of U.S.origin goods may appear to the foreign purchaser and its government as an export of a locally-manufactured product that happens to
contain certain imported components. The same difference in perception exists with regard to products manufactured abroad using
U.S.-origin technology. Similarly, what appears in the United States
as a sale by a foreign unit of a unified American MNE may appear
to the local managers and workers of the foreign subsidiary and their
government as a much-needed sale by a local employer, albeit one
ultimately controlled by foreign investors.'0 8 Indeed the subsidiary
may have carefully cultivated this local image, to its economic
advantage.10 9 American efforts to restrict such transactions inevitably irritate the people and governments of the affected foreign
nations. Foreign resentment is not, however, based solely on differences in perception. First, extraterritorial controls inhibit exports
from third countries, thus reducing foreign exchange receipts and
indirectly limiting production, employment, and national tax revenues.110 Second, compliance with such controls may mean that some
107. Cf. Abbott, supra note 14, at 826-57 (discussing political and economic costs of
foreign policy export controls in general).
108. See Tittmann, Extra-territorialApplication to U.S. Export ControlLaws on Foreign Subsidiaries of U.S. Corporations: An American Lawyer's View from Europe, 16
INV'L LAW. 730, 735 (1982).
109. Id.
110. See Fazzone, Business Effects of the ExtraterritorialReach of the U.S. Export
ControlLaws, 15 N.Y.U. J. INV'L L. & POL. 545, 574-79 (1982-83).
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third country firms will be unable to perform binding contracts."'
Such breaches of contract, or even delays in performance, may lead
to liability for damages,"12 or at least impair the commercial reputation of the affected firms. Third, United States controls often conflict
with the foreign economic policies of third countries."13 Finally,
third country governments often perceive extraterritorial export controls as unjustified interferences with their territorial sovereignty,
their internal ordrepublique, and thus as violations of international
law." 4 "Each extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction, when viewed
with a sensitivity to territorial sovereignty, appears to be an intrusion
which challenges a state's power and authority to control its realm.
It can become a matter of national pride, of national dignity.""u 5
The political tensions that extraterritorial export controls produce can absorb disproportionate amounts of the time and energy of
important government officials on both sides, distract attention from
underlying substantive issues, and interfere with the ability of the
United States and foreign governments to cooperate on other matters of mutual concern. There may be occasions when these costs are
worth incurring, but such occasions are likely to be rare given the
relatively poor record of economic sanctions in achieving political
objectives" 6 and the means and will to resist that the European
Governments demonstrated during the pipeline episode.'i'
B.

ECONOMIC COSTS

The economic costs to the United States of extraterritorial
11I.
See id. at 579-87.
112. A seller's liability for suspending performance or for delay typically depends
upon the allocation of risk in the contract. Most contracts in international trade contain
aforce majeure clause, typically providing that certain governmental actions will constitute sufficient grounds for nonperformance. Some contracts contain general provisions
excusing performance in cases of government regulation, while others specifically state
that inability to obtain an export license will excuse nonperformance. Id. at 580-81. In a
contract between a United States firm and a foreign customer, either type of provision
would probably exonerate the American exporter prevented from shipping by American
export control regulations. In a contract between a foreign seller and its customer, however, it is unclear whether aforce majeure clause that did not specifically refer to regulation by a third country government would relieve the seller from liability. Id; Berman &
Garson, supra note 1, at 872-73.
113. In commenting on the June 1982 pipeline regulations, for example, the European
Community stated: "The practical impact of the amendments to the Export Administration Regulations is that E.C. companies are pressed into service to carry out U.S. trade
policy towards the U.S.S.R., even though. . . the Community. . . has its own trade
policy toward the U.S.S.R." EEC Comments, supra note 41, at 719.
114. See id; Moyer & Mabry, supra note 3, at 81-82; Abbott, supra note 14, at 841.
115. D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 7, at 11.
116. See Abbott, supra note 14, at 821. But ef. Moyer & Mabry, supra note 3, at 16971 (suggesting that, if properly designed, export controls can in some circumstances be
valuable foreign policy tools). See generaly G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT,SUpra note 61.
117. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
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export controls, particularly those based on foreign policy,"1 " are primarily a product of uncertainty. A widespread perception that the
United States may in the future attempt to restrict foreign transactions linked to it by trade, technology transfer, investment, or other
economic relationships creates an element of uncertainty for any foreign business that contemplates entering into a transaction involving
such a link to the United States. In more familiar terms, this uncertainty constitutes political risk." 9 The degree of risk is greatly
increased by American assertions of jurisdiction to restrain the disposition of goods, technologies, and products of technology that
already have left U.S. territory. Political risk in effect increases the
cost' 20 to all potential foreign buyers of: (1) U.S.-origin goods and
technology; (2) foreign-origin goods containing U.S.-origin parts,
components, or materials, or produced with the aid of U.S.-origin
technology; (3) goods and technologies offered by foreign subsidiaries of American MNEs and other foreign firms controlled by U.S.
persons; and (4) other goods and technologies, such as leased equipment, with an economic link to the United States.
As in other areas of international business, political risk creates
an incentive for foreign firms to adjust their activities so as to reduce
the level of uncertainty and the related costs. 12 1 Extraterritorial
export controls give firms in Europe, for example, a clear economic
incentive to seek suppliers of goods, components, and technology in
countries other than the United States. 12 2 European governments
are given a parallel incentive--one they scarcely need-to encourage
their firms to buy locally and avoid U.S.-origin products and technology. Even before the 1982 pipeline sanctions, for example, British government officials were advising British firms to avoid
123
American components in politically sensitive transactions.
If political risk creates an incentive for foreign buyers to seek
suppliers free of economic links to the United States, it creates a cor118. Foreign policy controls are less predictable than national security controls, both
in terms of the products and target nations to which they may be applied. See generally
Fazzone, supra note 110, at 572-73; Abbott, supra note 14, at 831-37.
119. American firms are most often concerned with political risk in the context of
foreign direct investment, particularly in developing nations. See D. EITEMAN & A.
STONEHILL, supra note 73, at 184. In that setting, the existence of political risk has led to
the development of numerous business strategies aimed at minimizing losses from foreign government interference. Id. at 202-16. Political risk created by United States policy is economically indistinguishable and should call forth similar adaptive techniques.
120. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 76 (2d ed. 1977). Posner states
that "to the risk averse risk is a cost, and its elimination a gain." Id.
121. See supra note 119; Fazzone, supra note 110, at 576-77.
122. Fazzone, supra note 110, at 588-93; Ellicott, supra note 23, at 33.
123. Telephone interview with Patrick Morgan, Second Secretary-Commercial,
Embassy of the United Kingdom, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 11, 1982).

102

CORNELL INTERAATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:79

responding incentive for other foreign firms to produce the goods
desired. 124 In many capital- and technology-intensive industries, it is
problematical how quickly and to what extent a demand for nonU.S.-origin goods can call forth an increased supply. There are some
cases, however, in which American export controls appear to have
stimulated the growth of new capacity abroad, with foreign sellers
taking shares of the market formerly held by American exporters. 125
And at the least, there can be no question that extraterritorial trade
restraints create incentives for new entrants, some of which may be
assisted by their governments. 126
It also has been suggested that the possibility of future extraterritorial export controls creates an incentive for foreign governments
to bar U.S.-based MNEs from acquiring locally-owned firms. 127 In
one widely reported case, the British Monopolies and Mergers Commission opposed, and effectively blocked, such a proposed acquisition primarily because of the potential extraterritorial application of
American law. 128 Short of such an extreme policy, the possibility of
extraterritorial American regulation may induce foreign governments to exclude local subsidiaries of U.S.-based firms from subsidies, procurement programs, and other dirigiste policies designed to
assist locally-owned firms to move into profitable but politically sen29
sitive industries.1
In sum, the risk of extraterritorial trade controls can adversely
affect American exports of goods and technology, the operations of
foreign subsidiaries of American firms, the expansion of American
MNEs, and other economic activities. Moreover, if American
exports reflect the operation of comparative advantage, and if licensing and foreign direct investment reflect the efficient movement of
capital and technology from an area of relative abundance to one of
relative scarcity, 130 then the distortions in international economic
activity caused by extraterritorial trade controls tend to reduce world
economic welfare, not simply the welfare of the United States.
124. See Int'l Herald Tribune, July 26, 1982, at 1, col. 1; Int'l Herald Tribune, Sept.
29, 1982, at 6, col. 1 (French and West German governments encourage local production); Abbott, supra note 14, at 828 n.532.
125. See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 3, at 152-53 (describing effects of 1973 soybean
embargo, 1980 grain embargo, and post-1978 controls on export of tractors).
126. See Fazzone, supra note 110, at 573 n.149, 576.
127. See Tittmann, supra note 108, at 733.
128. See id; D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 7, at 64-65; Ellicott, supra
note 23, at 32.
129. See Tittman, supra note 108, at 734-35; Sf. Ellicott, supra note 23, at 32.
130. See F. RooT, supra note 65, at 500-01.
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IV
THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN DETERMINING
THE SCOPE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION
A.

ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO CONGRESS

The international controversy over extraterritorial American
export controls could be resolved in three general ways. First, for-

eign governments could unilaterally abandon their opposition to the
jurisdictional claims of the United States, out of deference to American power, respect for American economic and political interests, or
acquiescence in American arguments based on international law.

Alternatively, the United States could unilaterally renounce its
claims to extraterritorial jurisdiction, based on similar
considerations.
Each of these unilateral approaches, it should be noted, could

involve either a total or a partial change of position. Total renunciation by the United States, for example, would mean limiting the
13 1
President's authority under the Export Administration Act (EAA)

to the control of exports from U.S. territory. 132 Partial American
131. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503, extended,
Pub. L. No. 98-108, 97 Stat. 744 (Oct. 1, 1983), Pub. L. No. 98-207, 97 Stat. 744 (Dec. 5,
1983), Pub. L. No. 98-222, 98 Stat. 36 (Feb. 29, 1984), Exec. Order No. 12,470, 49 Fed.
Reg. 13,099 (1984) (continuing indefinitely provisions of the EAA of 1979 and all rules
and regulations issued thereunder) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp. V
1981)).
132. See infra notes 152-75 and accompanying text. Under the original version of the
EAA of 1969, the President was authorized only to "prohibit or curtail [export] from the
United States, its territories and possessions... except under such rules and regulations
as he [might] prescribe." Export Administration Act of 1969 § 4(b), 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2403(b) (1976) (expired 1979).
This language may be understood as authorizing the imposition of reexport controls.
The power to impose such controls can be seen as inherent in the President's authority to
prohibit exports completely. Exports are permitted only upon agreement by the foreign
importer, express or implied, to adhere to restrictions on resale prescribed by the President in "rules and regulations." See Morse & Powers, supranote 10, at 549. The precise
extent of this power, however, is not clear. See id. at 549 n.52.
The jurisdictional provision of the EAA of 1969 was expanded in 1977. Act of Dec. 28,
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 301(a), 91 Stat. 1625, 1629. Congress amended section
4(b)(1) of the EAA of 1969 as follows:
To effectuate the policies set forth in section 3 of this Act, the President may
prohibit or curtail the exportation [from the United States, its territories and possessions, of any articles, materials, or supplies, including technical data or any
other information], except under such rules and regulations as he shall prescribe,
ofany articles,materials orsupplies, including technicaldata or any otherinformation, subject to thejurisdictionofthe UnitedStates or exportedby anyperson subject to thejurisdictionof the United States.
H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 21 (1977) (bracketed material deleted from EAA
of 1969; italicized material added).
Under the EAA of 1979, the President is similarly authorized to prohibit or control
exports of goods or technology "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or
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renunciation would involve a more precise delineation of the jurisdictional reach of the statute, limiting it to transactions as to which
the position of the United States under international law is relatively
strong. 133 Similarly, partial withdrawal by foreign governments
would involve acceptance of U.S. jurisdiction in situations where a
strong foundation in international law exists, but continued opposition to less meritorious claims.
Finally, the various governments party to the controversy could
act jointly to resolve the controversy on some common ground, each
accommodating the interests and legal arguments of the others.
Such a mutual accommodation could also take place in two ways:
gradually, through a process of evolution, 134 or more rapidly,

through negotiations. 135 This Article recommends the latter
approach-mutual accommodation through negotiations.
Other than the first, the approaches outlined above require
action by the United States. Which approach is chosen, and how
successfully it is carried out, will depend in large measure on the
actions, or inaction, of Congress. The remainder of this section considers the strengths and weaknesses of each approach, as each is
exemplified by a specific proposal for congressional action, then
introduces the recommendation upon which the rest of the Article
will elaborate.
B.

THE EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH

The simplest approach for Congress--exemplified by S. 979, the
1984 Senate bill to extend and amend the EAA of 1979' 36-would be
to retain the jurisdictional provision presently in the EAA. 37 This
provision authorizes the President to prohibit or curtail, for the statutory purposes, exports of goods or technology "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or exported by any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States ...
,388. The model for the provision was the amended version of the Trading with the Enemy Act of
exported by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States... ." 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2405(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981) (provision applicable to foreign policy controls).
133. See infra notes 249-92, 319-61, 386-432 and accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 136-51 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 182-99 and accompanying text.
136. S. 979, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), 130 Cong. Rec. S1607 (daily ed. Feb. 23,
1984) S. 979 would leave the jurisdictional provisions of the statute intact. In the case of
foreign policy controls, however, it would require the President to "determine" in
advance that proposed controls "will not have an extraterritorial effect on countries
friendly to the United States adverse to overall United States foreign policy interests."
§ 6(4)(b)(4). Id at S1609.
137. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981) (provision relating to foreign policy
controls).
138. Id See supra note 132.
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1917,139 the statute under which most of the controversial extraterritorial trade controls of the 1950's and 1960's were imposed. 14°
Under the "loose phrasing" of this provision, 14 1 successive Presidents in essence would be free, as a matter of domestic law, to claim
whatever jurisdictional reach appeared necessary or appropriate in

future episodes of political trade controls. 142 In time, foreign reac-

tions to these jurisdictional claims would in all likelihood lead to a

resolution of the extraterritoriality dispute through the evolutionary
process of law formation characteristic of the international
community.
1.39. Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)) (TWEA). As originally enacted, the
TWEA authorized the President during time of war to regulate a variety of economic
transactions with other countries. In 1933, Congress amended section 5(b) of the Act to
make it applicable not only during wartime but also "during any other period of national
emergency declared by the President." Act of Mar. 9, 1933, ch. 1, § 2, 48 Stat. 1, 1
(repealed 1977).
The jurisdictional reach of the TWEA was itself expanded in 1941, in connection with
the entry of the United States into World War II. The Act originally authorized the
President only to regulate transactions of "any person within the United States" (TWEA,
§ 5(b)), but the 1941 amendment changed this phrase to "any person... subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States." Act of Dec. 18, 1941, ch. 593, sec. 301, § 5(b)(1), 55
Stat. 838, 839-40 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 5(b)(1) (1976). In 1977, Congress again limited
the authority of the TWEA to times of war. See Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95223, § 101(a), 91 Stat. 1625, 1625 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981)).
The same statute that limited the application of the TWEA enacted the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223,
§§ 201-208, 91 Stat. 1625, 1626-29 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. V 1981)).
The IEEPA delegates to the President, during periods of national emergency, powers
similar to those contained in the TWEA, but imposes several significant constraints. See
generally Note, The InternationalEmergency Economic Powers Act: A Congressional
Power, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1102 (1983). Under
Attempt to ControlPresidentialEmergency
the IEEPA, the President is authorized to regulate transactions "by any person, or with
respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." 50 U.S.C.
§ 1702(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
140. See, e.g., supra notes 57-59.
141. Dresser Memorandum, supra note 47, at 68.
142. The jurisdictional provision in the EAA since 1977 is highly imprecise, perhaps
intentionally so. See Dresser Memorandum, supra note 47, at 66. Even the Senate
Banking Committee, two years after the provision was enacted, observed that "[t]he possible application of [the jurisdictional provision] to nonemergency situations may not
have been considered adequately by the Congress at the time the provision was
adopted," and noted that foreign opposition to certain types of extraterritorial regulation
was likely. S. REP. No. 169, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979).
In the litigation commenced by the foreign firms subjected to temporary denial orders
for violation of the 1982 pipeline regulations, see supra notes 51-54 and accompanying
text, a major issue was whether the President's actions were authorized under the statute
as a matter of congressional intent. See, e.g., Dresser Memorandum, supra note 47, at
49-70; John Brown Memorandum, supra note 19, at 18-23. This issue was treated separately from the question whether the statute should be interpreted so as to accord with
international law, and if so whether the President's actions violated international law and
thus, indirectly, the EAA. See, e.g., Dresser Memorandum, supra note 47, at 70-87; John
Brown Memorandum, supra note 19, at 23-33. Neither issue was definitively resolved in
the course of the litigation. See Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Baldridge, 549 F. Supp. 108
(D.D.C. 1982).
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Affected foreign states may react to an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in various ways. They may acquiesce, as the
Europeans did for the most part during the first phase of the pipeline
episode. Alternatively, if the regulation is particularly burdensome
or offensive, they may oppose it, using an assortment of political and
economic weapons including diplomatic protests, suspension of
negotiations, or agreements on unrelated matters, legal actions in
domestic or international forums, blocking orders, nationalizations
and other reprisals.1 43 The United States may respond to such challenges with additional sanctions. 44 Individual firms affected by the
controls may commence their own legal actions. 45 Public opinion in
the United States and the affected foreign nations may be mobilized.
In the denouement of each such episode, the American assertion of
jurisdiction may be maintained-successfully or unsuccessfullywithdrawn, or modified.
These episodes can be treated as something akin to a sequence
of common law decisions. 46 Observers will be able to discern a
"holding" on the propriety of each claim of jurisdiction in the outcome of the episode and in the consensus of informed opinion. As
each new episode of extraterritorial regulation begins, decisionmakers will bear in mind (or so it is hoped) the "holdings" of
prior "cases" in the sequence. Over time-perhaps a rather long
time-more or less clearly defined jurisdictional rules, based on both
principle and power, should emerge. This evolutionary process, in
short, would resemble the way in which customary international law
147
normally is formed.
One can hope, however, that the jurisdictional dispute over
American export controls will not be consigned to the evolutionary
143. Cf. Thompson, supra note 10, at 390.
144. See id.
145. See, e.g., Dresser Industries, 549 F. Supp. 108; Judgment of Sept. 17, 1982,
Arandissementsrechtbank, Hague, W. No. 82/716, supra note 54.
146. Cf 3 A. LOWENFELD, supra note 3, at ch. II, § 5.65.
147. In describing the evolutionary formation of customary international law, one
commentator has stated:
Like the Hegelian-Marxist struggle of thesis and antithesis, [a right or obligation
under international law] (thesis) is met with a violation (antithesis), which violation, if it "catches hold," may give rise to a new rule (synthesis). The violation of
the [right or obligation] may thus contain the seeds of a new rule, but the critical
question is what the other nations will do about it. If they accept the violation, a
new customary rule is on its way toward being formed. But if they isolate the
violation, label it a violation, and punish the transgressor, then instead of the
seed of a new rule taking hold, the seed is trampled upon and the original customary rule is reinforced. What might have been an impediment to the formation of a customary rule instead becomes another instance of its confirmation.
D'Amato, The Concept ofHuman Rights in InternationalLaw, 82 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1110,
1118 (1982) (footnote omitted).
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law formation process. 148 International confrontations over extraterritorial regulation result in wasteful political conflict and economic
losses for all countries concerned. 49 Indeed, the mere risk of extraterritorial regulation distorts trade and investment. 150 The transaction costs of the evolutionary process seem unacceptably high,
especially because that process may require decades to complete.
The transaction costs would not be unacceptable, of course, if there
were no less costly alternatives. This Article, however, argues that
Congress could create a more efficient process for generating rules to
govern extraterritorial trade controls, with a considerable reduction
in political and economic cost.' 5 '
C.

THE TERRITORIAL APPROACH-REPEAL OF PRESIDENTIAL
AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE EXTRATERRITORIAL CONTROLS

Foreign governments 152 and businesses 53 affected by extraterritorial export controls have supported a much more radical solution,
akin to the full unilateral renunciation described above. They have
argued that Congress should limit the President's authority under
the EAA to the control of exports from U.S. territory, at least in the
case of controls imposed for foreign policy reasons. This approach
was exemplified by a bill introduced early in the 98th Congress by
Representative Don Bonker, Chairman of the House Subcommittee
on International Economic Policy and Trade.' 54 Under the Bonker
bill, the President would have been authorized only to "prohibit or
curtail the exportation from the United States of any goods, technology or other information produced in the United States . . .,.
To mitigate the effects of this limitation on executive authority, the
148. But see Thompson, supra note 10, at 393-95 (evolutionary process preferable to
absolute rule favoring territorial state over nationality state in regulation of foreign
subsidiaries).
149. See supra notes 107-30 and accompanying text.
150. Id.
151. See infra notes 200-32 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Reagan AdministrationAimingfor Billto be Ready This Week, but Status
Unclear, 18 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY 967, 971-72 (1983) (reports on European Community

aide-memoire to the Reagan Administration criticizing recent foreign policy controls
practice).
153. See, e.g., Reauthorizationofthe ExportAdministrationAct: Hearingson S. 397,S.
407, . 434 andS. 979 Be/ore the Subcommt on InternationalFinanceandMonetaryPolicy

of the Senate Comna on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 491
(1983) (statement of Bernard J. O'Keefe, representing the National Association of Manufacturers) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
154. H.R. 1566, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
155. Id. at § 105(a). The quoted language was included in the bill passed by the
House of Representatives in October 1983 to extend and amend the EAA of 1979. H.R.
3231, § 113(a), 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). H.R. 3231, however, includes an anti-evasion
provision, id. at § 113(b), that would expand the jurisdictional reach of the statute. See
infra note 252 and accompanying text.
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Bonker bill specified that Congress could impose extraterritorial con56
trols by joint resolution at the request of the President.
In all likelihood, such a revision of the statute would reduce the
incidence of extraterritorial controls and thus the political and economic costs associated with them. But the approach has a number of
deficiencies. First, limiting the jurisdictional reach of foreign policy
controls alone would invite the President to classify proposed export
Is7
restrictions as national security controls under the EAA of 1979.
The manner in which President Carter imposed the grain embargo
on the Soviet Union in 1980158 demonstrates that such a reclassifica-

tion could easily take place. This problem could be avoided only by
defining the limits of national security controls so precisely that
alternate classifications were no longer possible or by repealing the
President's power to impose extraterritorial national security controls. The first of these alternatives, however, seems unrealistic, at
least given the lack of fundamental agreement on the meaning of

"national security" in the context of trade controls. 5 9 The second
seems both imprudent and unnecessary for several reasons:

(1) national security controls are of fundamental importance to the
United States;160 (2) international law may well permit more exten156. H.R. 1566, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 105(b) (1983). Under section 105(b), if the
President determined that extraterritorial export controls were necessary in a particular
case, he could "impose those controls only if [he] submits that determination to the Congress, together with a report ... with respect to the proposed controls, and only if a joint
resolution is enacted authorizing the imposition of those controls." Id. The bill spelled
out in detail a procedure for consideration of a Presidential request. Id.
157. Under the EAA of 1979, the President is authorized to control exports only in
furtherance of specific policies enumerated in the statute. See 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2404(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981) (national security controls), § 2405(a)(l) (foreign policy controls), § 2406(a)(1) (short supply controls), each referring to policies spelled out in 50
U.S.C. app. § 2402. Under the substantive sections of the statute, different criteria and
procedures apply to presidential action depending on the particular policies being pursued. See Abbott, supra note 14, at 85 8-59. The clarity of this scheme is only superficial,
however. In particular, within the language of the statute certain types of controls can be
labelled either national security controls, foreign policy controls, or both. See id. at 85960.
158. The grain embargo was identified by the President as being in furtherance of
both the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, and thus
authorized under both of the relevant sections of the EAA of 1979. By this characterization, the President was able to avoid both certain procedural requirements and the possibility of a congressional veto, each of which was applicable under the statute only in
connection with foreign policy controls. See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 3, at 30-32;
Abbott, supra note 14, at 859-60.
159. See generally Note, U.S. Technology Transfersto the Soviet Union andthe Protection o/NationalSecuriy, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1037 (1979).
160. Such controls are intended to limit the export of items that would make significant contributions to the military potential of foreign countries that would be detrimental
to United States national security. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(A) (Supp. V 1981). Under
the proposed revision of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, "the importance of
regulation to the regulating state" would be a factor to be considered in determining
whether a proposed exercise ofjurisdiction is "reasonable." RESTATEMENT OF FOREIoN
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sive extraterritorial regulation when national security is involved; 16 1
and (3) the major disputes over extraterritorial trade controls in the

past have involved politically motivated controls, not national security controls of the sort authorized under the EAA of 1979.162 In
short, the territorial approach of the Bonker bill is appropriate only
for foreign policy controls, and as a result could occasionally be sidestepped by an alert Chief Executive.

A second problem with the territorial approach of the Bonker
bill is that it would create an incentive for United States firms to

transfer operations potentially subject to export controls overseas to
foreign subsidiaries, joint ventures and other affiliates, or licensees.

Concern over such "foreign sourcing" is probably the principal
objection to this approach in Congress. 63 Several types of foreign
sourcing might be possible under the territorial approach to

regulation.
If exports of particular products from the United States were

restricted, for example, an MNE with strong central coordination
could avoid the restrictions by referring inquiries from potential purchasers of the controlled products to foreign subsidiaries that already

produce them. The flexibility needed for such tactics clearly exists
among American MNEs.

64

Without extraterritorial authority, the

President could neither prohibit foreign subsidiaries from filling
such orders nor penalize them for doing so. This does not mean,

however, that the President would lack all power to constrain such
activities. An equivalent degree of control over the activities of foreign subsidiaries could probably be achieved by regulations and

penalties addressed to American parent corporations or to individual
American officers and directors of the subsidiaries, although such
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) §
1981) [hereinafter cited as REVISED RESTATEMENT].

403(2)(c)

(TENT. DRAFr No. 2,

161. REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 160, at § 403(2)(c); Marcuss & Richard,

supra note 10, at 41.
162. See supra notes 57-59. While the extraterritorial controls on trade with China,
Cuba, and other nations involved in these disputes were first imposed in crisis situations,
including military action, they soon came to be regarded as foreign policy measures. See
Abbott, supra note 14, at 758.
163. Interview with William Reinsch, Chief Legislative Assistant to Senator John
Heinz (Mar. 11, 1983). See 129 CONG. REc. H8346-47 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1983) (remarks
of Reps. Erlenborn, Bonker).
164. The Machinery and Allied Products Institute, for example, recently surveyed
thirty-nine multinational manufacturing firms, operating both through exports from the
United States and through foreign affiliates, to learn if they diverted transactions abroad
to take advantage of generous export financing by foreign governments. The survey
results indicate that during one year, 1981, fourteen of these firms sourced thirty-nine
transactions, worth nearly $400 million, through foreign affiliates for that reason alone.
Machinery and Allied Products Institute, MAPI Survey of Selected Member Companies
Concerning Export Financing (Mar. 1982).
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indirect regulation could again ignite foreign resistance. 16

In addition, under a territorial approach to regulation, domestic
firms concerned about future export restrictions might choose to
license their technology to foreign firms, establish foreign manufac-

turing facilities, or transfer the production of sensitive products to
foreign affiliates rather than produce at home for export. 166 The
number of firms that would take such a step to avoid American
export controls, however, almost certainly would be small. Major

knowledge-intensive firms, in particular, are generally reluctant to
transfer their technology to outsiders, 167 and therefore would be

more likely to consider foreign direct investment than licensing. The
decision to invest or expand abroad, however, is highly complex,

turning on many economic and political variables. 168 The opportunity to reduce political risk emanating from the United States cer-

tainly would figure in the calculus and would tend to offset the
normally higher political risk encountered abroad, 169 but it would be
surprising if this factor alone tipped the balance very frequently. In
any case, MNEs tend to be large firms in oligopolistic industries,
highly visible to American regulators.170 Even under the territorial

approach of the Bonker bill, if foreign subsidiaries of American
MNEs interfered significantly with U.S. export controls, their activities could be restricted by act of Congress. 17 1 The threat of such

regulation would make foreign investment less attractive in the first
instance, but would again keep alive the possibility of international
172
political conflict.
This discussion points to a third problem with the Bonker bill,
the most important from the perspective of this Article: the bill
would do nothing to clarify the scope of the United States' extraterritorial jurisdiction. In the case of American MNEs, it would do no
165. See Thompson, supra note 10, at 360. On the efficacy of indirect regulation,
Thompson states: "While the alternative method of regulation purporting to focus on the
conduct of the U.S. parent or officer may be a more limited exercise of jurisdiction, it
does not seem to result in appreciably less regulation of subsidiaries." Id See iAfra notes
422-32 and accompanying text.
166. For a discussion of the possibility that firms operating in the United States might
establish foreign licensee or subsidiary arrangements in order to circumvent export controls, see Hearings,supra note 153, at 400 (statement of Theodore L. Thau, former Executive Secretary of The Export Control (Administration) Review Board).
167. See Vagts, supra note 89, at 768.
168. For one model of the kinds of economic calculations that must be made, see F.
RooT, supra note 65, at 523-24.
169. See id. at 524.
170. Id. at 525.
171. See supra note 156 and ccompanying text.
172. The bill passed by the House in October 1983 includes an anti-evasion provision,
see supra note 155, aimed at the problem of foreign sourcing. See 129 CONo. REC.
H8347 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1983) (remarks of Rep. Bonker).
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more than transfer the power to impose extraterritorial foreign pol-

icy controls from the President to Congress. It would also leave the
President an undefined level of authority to impose reexport and

product of technology controls. 173 Continued uncertainty over the
imposition of such controls might reduce the incentive of American
firms to move sensitive operations abroad. At the same time, how-

ever, this uncertainty would leave nearly intact the incentives now
existing for foreign firms to avoid transactions with links to the
United States,174 and it would leave significant potential for international political conflict. 17 5 The dispute over extraterritoriality would

be better solved by an effort to spell out, at least for certain wellunderstood transactions, just how far the American writ should run
and where it should stop.

D.

THE MIDDLE ROAD: DEFINING THE SCOPE OF AMERICAN
JURISDICTION

The evolutionary rule-formation process almost certainly would
establish limits on extraterritorial regulation somewhere between the
extensive jurisdictional claims underlying the pipeline regulations
and the pure territorial approach of the Bonker bill. An effort to

define the scope of American jurisdiction without resort to that process should aim to approximate this mediate position.

Congress could attempt unilaterally to define the reach of U.S.
jurisdiction under the EAA of 1979 at some intermediate level,

authorizing or refusing to authorize particular forms of extraterritorial regulation depending on the strength of the American arguments

under international law and on the ability of the United States to
enforce any controls it might impose. The approach of partial unilateral renunciation 176 is exemplified by two current legislative pro-

posals. First, the House bill to amend and extend the EAA of 1979,
approved in October 1983, differs from the original Bonker bill dis173. The Bonker bill would have allowed the President to "prohibit or curtail" exports
from the United States. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. It would have left
unchanged the authority granted the Secretary of Commerce under the EAA of 1979 to
require export licenses "[u]nder such conditions as may be imposed." 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2403(a) (Supp. V 1981). Thus, the President would still have been able to make the
argument that controls on reexports and analogous transactions--that is, controls on the
reexport of goods and technology, controls on foreign sales of end products containing
U.S.-origin components or materials, and foreign sales of products manufactured with
U.S.-origin technology-were justified as conditions imposed on the original export of
goods or technology from the United States. See supra note 132. See generally Morse &
Powers, supra note 10, at 544-53. The same ambiguity is present in the bill ultimately
passed by the House of Representatives, H.R. 3231, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). See
supra note 155 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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cussed above 177 in including an anti-evasion provision that could
serve to authorize some level of extraterritorial regulation. 178 This
provision will be discussed in more detail below. 179 Second, the
American Bar Association, acting upon a recommendation from its
Section of International Law and Practice, has recommended an
amendment to the EAA of 1979 forbidding several forms of extraterritorial regulation. 180 Certain of the ABA recommendations also
181
will be discussed further below.
As persuasive as these proposals are, however, a more acceptable and lasting resolution of the dispute over extraterritorial export
controls would be achieved by involving concerned foreign governments in an effort to reach a negotiated settlement. The issue of
extraterritoriality is primarily a question of conflict between the laws
and policies of two or more nations, 182 not simply a question of the
proper reach of U.S. law. It is at the same time a matter of fundamental concern to the international system of nation-states. 183
Direct international negotiation is unquestionably the most sensible
way of dealing with an issue of this kind.
Mutual accommodation through negotiation 84 would have several advantages over a unilateral solution. First, moderate negotiated limits on American jurisdiction would reduce the level of
political conflict and economic distortion' 85 because they would
reflect the essential interests of the major affected nations and their
firms. Second, from the point of view of the United States, negotiations hold out the prospect of valuable foreign concessions that
would not be forthcoming with a unilateral solution. 8 6 Finally, a
demonstrated willingness to negotiate might itself enhance U.S. relations with nations antagonized by the extraterritorial application of
American law.
177. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 155 & 172.
179. See infra notes 249-92 and accompanying text.
180. See House of Delegates Approves Section's Recommendations, INT'L L. NEWS,
Fall 1983, at 1, 9; Section of International Law and Practice, American Bar Association,
Report to the House of Delegates (1983) [hereinaftere cited as Report to the House of
Delegates].
181. See infra note 361 and accompanying text.

182. See

REVISED RESTATEMENT,

supra note 160, at 89-90, 92-93; Address by Deputy

Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam to the American Society of International Law (Apr.
15, 1983) ("confficts of jurisdiction" describes issue "more neutrally and analytically"
than "extraterritoriality") (copy on fie at offices of the CornellInternationalLawJournal)
[hereinafter cited as Dam Address].
183. See generally Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdictionat a Crossroads: An Intersection
Between Public and PrivateInternationalLaw, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 281 (1982).
184. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 107-30 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 433-48 and accompanying text.
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An appropriate forum for negotiations may already exist. In
1976, the governments of the member countries of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) issued a Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. 187 Attached as an Annex to the Declaration was a set of
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 8 " The Guidelines explicitly recognize the problem of conflicting legal requirements imposed
on units of an MNE by two or more member governments, 189 the
problem that arose during the pipeline episode in the case of Dresser
(France). 190 The Guidelines also provide for international consultations, stating that "[m]ember countries have agreed to establish
appropriate review and consultation procedures" for handling all
issues arising thereunder. 91 More specifically, when MNEs are subjected to conflicting requirements, "the governments concerned will
co-operate in good faith with a view to resolving such problems
.

..,"192 The governments may negotiate under the auspices of the

OECD Committee on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises (CIIME) or through other mutually acceptable arrangements. 93 The OECD Council, moreover, has issued a formal decision to the effect that member governments may request
consultations in the CIME on any problem of conflicting requirements, with the governments concerned obliged to cooperate in good
faith. 194

These mechanisms for consultation have never been utilized
during a major international dispute. 195 Since mid-1983, however, a
CIME working group on international investment policies has been
187. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Declarationon InternationalInvestment and Multinational Enterprises, OECD Press Release A(76)20 (June
21, 1976), reprintedin 15 I.L.M. 967 (1976).
188. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Annex to the Declaration of 21st June, 1976 by Governments of
OECD Member Countries on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises,
reprintedin 15 I.L.M. 969 (1976) [hereinafter cited as OECD Guidelines].
189. Id. at para. 11.
190. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
191. OECD Guidelines, supra note 188, at para. 11.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Revised Decision of
the Council on Inter-Governmental Consultation Procedures on the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, at para. 5 (July 20, 1979), reprintedin 18 I.L.M. 1171 (1979). The
Revised Decision replaces a Decision taken by the OECD Council in 1976, in connection
with the original adoption of the Guidelines. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Decision of the Council on Inter-Governmental Consultation
Procedures on the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (June 21, 1976), reprintedin
15 I.L.M. 977 (1976).
195. Telephone interview with Philip Lincoln, Deputy Director, Office of Investment
Affairs, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State (Mar. 20,
1984).
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discussing the general problem of conflicting requirements for
MNEs.1 96 These discussions seem to have been motivated at least in
part by the pipeline episode, but are not limited to export control
problems. Indeed, as this is written, the discussions have not yet
197
begun to focus on any specific areas of conffict.
What is needed, then, is some spur to the more aggressive pursuit of negotiations, whether in the CIIME or in some other forum.
Negotiation itself is an executive function, but Congress is in a position to promote negotiations, even to require them, as it has done in
other contexts in the EAA of 1979.198 Negotiations also might be

aided by the generation of new ideas on how to bridge the diverse
positions on extraterritoriality held in the United States and
abroad. 199 Again, Congress is in an ideal position to encourage the
development of such ideas.
V
A PROPOSAL FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
This section offers a proposal for congressional action to resolve
the international dispute over extraterritorial export controls. The
proposal is in three parts: (1) that the United States demonstrate its
good faith by imposing a moratorium on certain extraterritorial
export controls; (2) that Congress establish a national commission to
study the problem of extraterritorial trade regulation (or the broader
generic issue of extraterritoriality); and (3) that Congress direct the
President to commence international negotiations on the issue.
While substantive international negotiations are the only essential
part of the package, the other two components of the proposal, particularly the second, would be valuable preparatory steps.
A. A

MORATORIUM ON EXTRATERRITORIAL TRADE CONTROLS

An interim action manifesting a good faith commitment to the
resolution of the extraterritoriality dispute might do much to ensure
that negotiations occur in a productive atmosphere free of recrimination. In international relations, an interim action of this sort often
takes the form of a standstill agreement.2 00 A standstill arrangement
serves a dual function: it avoids the outbreak of new disputes during
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(i) (Supp. V 1981) (negotiations with COCOM
member nations); id. at § 2405(g) (negotiations to eliminate foreign availability).
199. Cf. Dam Address, supra note 182, at 23 ("The problem is ripe for creative legal

thinking.").
200. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XVI(4), added by Protocol Amending the Preamble and Parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs
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the period of negotiation, and it symbolizes a good faith approach to

the negotiations themselves.
It would be appropriate for the United States to introduce a uni-

lateral standstill measure, because the actions producing the present
controversy have been almost exclusively those of the United States.
As one approach, Congress could enact a moratorium on the imposi-

tion of new extraterritorial foreign policy export controls under the
EAA of 1979 for a period sufficient to complete the other parts of the

process recommended here. Such a moratorium would serve the
desired political functions without undermining basic American
export control programs. Most important, existing national security
reexport and product of technology controls under the EAA of 1979
would remain in effect; so would current national security restrictions on sales by foreign subsidiaries, which are not maintained
under the EAA20 ' United States embargoes of North Korea, Viet-

nam, Kampuchea, and Cuba, also maintained under authority other
than the EAA, would be unaffected. 20 2 A moratorium on future

extraterritorial foreign policy controls would leave in effect existing

20 3
political controls under the EAA, but these are few in number,

and should not create a significant amount of tension.
Furthermore, with the moratorium limited to the EAA, the
President would still possess the power to impose emergency controls

under the IEEPA.2°4 Moreover, a moratorium restricted to action
under the EAA technically would not limit the ability of Congress to
impose extraterritorial controls by separate legislation. To realize
the full political benefits from a moratorium, however, Congress
should declare its intention to exercise restraint in the use of extraterand Trade, done at Geneva March 10, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 1767, T.I.A.S. No. 3930, 278
U.N.T.S. 167 (entered into force in part for the United States Oct. 7, 1957).
201. Transaction Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 505.01-.60 (1983). These regulations were originally imposed under the TWEA, see supra note 139 and accompanying
text. In 1977, the TWEA was amended to limit its applicability to times of war. See Act
of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(a), 91 Stat. 1625, 1625. Regulations then in
effect under the TWEA, however, were allowed to continue in effect so long as they were
annually extended by the President. Id. at §§ 101(b)-101(c).
202. The embargo of Cuba is maintained under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101-.809 (1983). The others are maintained under the Foreign
Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.101-.809 (1983). Like the Transaction
Control Regulations, see supra note 201, both are maintained under the Act of Dec. 28,
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, §§ 101(b)-101(ce), 91 Stat. 1625, 1625. See generally Malloy,
Embargo Programsofthe United States TreasuryDepartment, 20 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 485 (1981).
203. See 49 Fed. Reg. 3061 (1984) (extension of foreign policy controls through Jan.
20, 1985).
204. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. V 1981); supra note 139 and accompanying
text.
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ritorial controls and to consult fully with affected nations before
imposing them.
B.

A

COMMISSION TO STUDY THE EXTRATERRITORIAL

APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROLS

A comprehensive study of the issues raised by extraterritorial
export controls could prepare the United States for more productive
international negotiations. First, such a study could clarify the fundamental American interests that would require protection under an
international agreement. Those interests undoubtedly include, for
example, adequate controls on militarily critical goods and technologies. Second, it could clarify those national interests that would benefit from an international agreement. Those include an interest in
the free movement of goods and capital and an interest in sound
political relations with important allies and trading partners. Third,
a study could clarify the interests of foreign governments, foreign
firms, and MNEs that should be reflected in any negotiated settlement. Finally, a study could identify a range of jurisdictional formulations that could serve as bases for negotiation and for lasting
agreement.
Even if international negotiations never took place, or were not

successful, a study could help the United States formulate an internal consensus on the proper scope of extraterritorial regulation, perhaps leading to a unilateral adjustment of its jurisdictional claims.
At the very least, a study would produce additional facts concerning
the effectiveness and costs of extraterritorial trade controls and a better understanding of the differing views on the issue of
20 5
extraterritoriality.
Congress could provide for a study in a number of ways. It
could authorize staff reports and conduct hearings through the
appropriate standing committees or through an ad hoc committee.
Alternatively, it could direct the Executive branch to conduct an

interagency study and report to Congress on its findings. The most
effective approach, however, would be for Congress to establish a
national study commission on extraterritorial trade controls. Such a
body would be both more independent than an interagency task
force and more efficient and expert than a congressional committee.
An excellent model would be the proposed Commission on the
International Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws (CIAAL). 2° 6 Crea205. Cf. D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 7, at 90-91 (suggesting need to
clarify views on international law).
206. See To Establish a Commission on the InternationalApplication ofAntitrust Laws.
Hearingson S. 1010 Before the Senate Committee on GovernmentalAffairs, 96th Cong.,
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tion of a CIAAL was proposed in both the 96th and 97th Congresses, 20 7 but was never approved. The last two administrations
refused to support the CIAAL proposals, 208 despite the fact that
scholars, businessmen, and other interested parties widely endorsed
209
them.
Sponsors of the CIAAL structured it to ensure high-level participation from the Executive branch and Congress as well as from concerned private sector groups. The CIAAL would have consisted of
eighteen presidential appointees: four members each from the
House of Representatives and the Senate; four from the Executive
branch; and six from the private sector. 210 Both the congressional
and private sector representatives were to be balanced in terms of
party affiliation. 211 Working within these limitations, the President
was to appoint persons who were "broadly representative of the vari21 2
ous interests, needs, and concerns" affected by the antitrust laws.
The CIAAL would have been authorized to appoint a staff, to enter
into research contracts, to conduct hearings, and to administer
213
oaths.
Of particular interest here are the functions the CIAAL was
designed to perform. The Commission would first have had a general mandate to study and make recommendations concerning the
international aspects of the antitrust laws. 21 4 In addition, it would
have been specifically directed to examine certain issues of fact and
law.21 5 Factual matters included the effect of the antitrust laws on
the ability of American firms to compete effectively abroad, their
effect on U.S. relations with other countries, and the difficulty of
enforcing the laws abroad.21 6 The first CIAAL proposal also speciIst Sess. (1979-80) [hereinafter cited as 1980 CIAL Hearings]. For a suggestion that a
body resembling the CIAAL be formed to investigate the problem of extraterritoriality in
the area of export controls and other fields, see Soviet-European Gas Pipeline: Hearing
Before the Subcomm on InternationalEconomic Policy of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 41-42 (1982) (statement of Douglas Rosenthal).
207. S. 1010, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 432, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
208. See, e.g., 1980 CIA,4L Hearings,supra note 206, at 19-39 (statement of Ky P.
Ewing, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice); The Commission on the InternationalApplication of the U.S. Antitrust Laws Act:
Hearingon S. 432 Before the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36
(1981) (statement of William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
U.S. Dept. of Justice) [hereinafter cited as 1981 CIAAL Hearing].
209. See, e.g., Griffin, Possible Resolutions of InternationalDisputes Over Enforcement
of U.S. Antitrust Laws, 18 STAN. J. IN'L L. 279, 300-01 (1982).
210. S. 432, supra note 207, at § 2(b).
211. Id. at § 2(h).
212. Id. at § 2(1).
213. Id. at § 5.
214. Id. at § 3(a)(1).
215. Id. at § 3(b).
216. Id.
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fled with particularity the legal issues to be studied: the scope of
sovereign immunity; the act of state doctrine; the effects doctrine;
and other legal rules that frequently arise in antitrust cases. 217 The
later proposal was more general, directing the Commission to study
"the jurisdiction and scope of the application of the antitrust laws to
foreign conduct and foreign parties ....-218
Like the proposed CIAAL, an export controls commission could
usefully be directed to study relevant factual and legal issues.
Among the factual matters that might be specified are: (1) the effect
of extraterritorial controls on the ability of U.S. exporters, technology licensors, and MNEs to compete effectively abroad; (2) the effect
of such controls on relations with other nations; (3) the importance
of extraterritorial regulation to national security and foreign policy
controls, including its effectiveness in preventing trade with target
nations; (4) the forms of blocking action taken by foreign nations in
the past and available for use in the future; (5) the exposure of the
United States to reciprocal measures by foreign governments; and
(6) the forms and likelihood of private evasion and avoidance that
could be expected if the United States were to restrict the scope of its
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Legal issues the Commission might be directed to study include:
(1) the status under international law of controls on reexports of
goods and technology and on sales of products using American technology; (2) the nationality of corporations under international law
and the degree to which that law supports the regulation of a subsidiary by its parent company's government; (3) the effect under international law of a private foreign importer's consent to American
regulation; (4) the applicability of the doctrine of foreign sovereign
compulsion; and (5) the role of the comity and reasonableness
doctrines.
At the 1981 congressional hearings on the CIAAL,2 19 William

Baxter, then Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division, stated that the Department
could not support the CIAAL proposal because it was too limited in
scope. He stated that a study commission should not deal only with
the antitrust laws, because the extraterritoriality problems associated
with antitrust also arise in other fields. 220 Other commentators, too,
have argued that extraterritoriality is a "generic" problem.22 '
Responding to this concern, Senator Mathias, author of the CIAAL
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

S. 1010, supra note 207, at § 2(b).
S. 432, supra note 207, at § 3(b)(3).
1981 CIA4L Hearing,supra note 208, at 35.
Id.
D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 7, at 83.
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proposals, introduced a bill in 1983 to establish a commission to
study the general problem of extraterritoriality. 2 2
The generic approach certainly would be useful, but there
remains much to be said for a more narrowly focused commission.
If extraterritoriality were treated as a generic problem, it could
become more unmanageable than if it were reduced to its specialized
parts. Both the CIAAL and an export controls commission could
deal with well-defined areas of controversy that involved issues and
transactions relatively well understood by the commission members.
A specialized commission might thus be able to produce sophisticated and precise recommendations, while a commission focusing on
broad issues might produce only generalities.
Moreover, while the extraterritoriality issues in different fields
may be similar, they are by no means identical. In antitrust, for
example, the most important issue is the applicability of the effects
doctrine.22 3 That doctrine, however, is considerably less relevant in
the export control field. Antitrust controversies involve attitudes
toward competition policy; that issue is also of little relevance to
trade controls. Antitrust disputes often focus on problems associated
with private litigation, such as discovery and treble damages, 224 but
such litigation is basically irrelevant to export controls. The precedents in the two fields also differ considerably; judicial decisions
dominate antitrust law, but are quite rare in the area of export
controls.
C.

INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

International negotiations are the most important element of

this proposal. Congress should direct the President to enter into
negotiations on the extraterritorial reach of American export controls with the major trading and investment partners of the United
States. Congress might also urge the President to follow the Commission's findings during these negotiations, although those recommendations should not be binding.
This proposal envisions actual negotiations, i.e., meetings
among interested parties designed "to arrive through discussion at
some kind of agreement or compromise."'2 5 Such discussions are to
be distinguished from mere exchanges of preexisting views that bring
about little movement toward a common position. During the pipeline episode, the United States and its allies-particularly Great
222. S. 1373, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
223. See D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 7, at 18-41.
224. Id. at 23, 70-75.
225.

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIoNARY 1514 (1976).
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Britain-appeared to be locked into such fixed positions. More
recently, however, both sides have stressed the need for amicable
resolution of the controversy, 226 and the United States has indicated
some willingness to compromise, at least on the issue of retroactivity. 227 This is encouraging, because a lasting solution will require all
sides to make substantive concessions.
The technique of "principled negotiation" popularized by
Roger Fisher and William Ury could be even more productive than
an approach based on "concessions. ' 228 Principled negotiation is to
be contrasted with "positional negotiation." In positional negotiation, "[e]ach side takes a position, argues for it, and makes concessions to reach a compromise." 229 Positional negotiations tend to be
lengthy and arduous. More importantly, they often damage the
ongoing relationships of the parties, and tend to produce outcomes
230
that fail to satisfy their underlying interests.
In principled negotiations, the parties jointly attempt to identify
the fundamental interests involved in the dispute, rather than exposing only negotiating positions. They then jointly consider many possible ways of reconciling their divergent interests, emphasizing any
common interests that appear, and adopt a solution based upon
objective criteria.231 The principled negotiation approach stresses
the possibility of joint gain.232 This emphasis is appropriate for
negotiations on trade controls because the potential gains from resolution of the dispute-improved political relations and elimination
of distortions in international trade and investment flows-are substantial and have been neglected in prior discussions of the problem.
D.

SUGGESTED FORMULATIONS FOR NEGOTIATION

In line with the emphasis placed by the theory of principled
negotiation on the consideration of many possible options for
mutual accommodation and gain,233 this section identifies a number
of objective formulations that define with some precision a variety of
limits on the scope of extraterritorial trade controls. These formula-

tions might be used by negotiators as bases for reconciling conflicting national interests. Although the formulations vary substantially,
226. See Dam Address, supra note 182; Havers, Good Fences Make Good Neighbors:
A Discussion of Problems Concerning the Exercise of Jurisdiction, 17 INT'L LAW. 794

(1983).
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Dam Address, supra note 182, at 18-20.
R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING To YEs 11 (1981).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 5-8.
Id. at 41-98.
Id. at 73-76.
Id. at 58-73.
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several themes recur: (1) the United States should be allowed to regulate forms of foreign conduct that contribute to the evasion of controls on exports from U.S. territory; (2) the United States should not
be allowed to regulate foreign conduct when the transaction in question is, or has become, predominantly "foreign"; (3) the United
States should not interfere retroactively with foreign conduct.
The ultimate solution may be much different from any
advanced here. Indeed, the theory of principled negotiation suggests
234
that it may be necessary to consider far more imaginative options.
The strength of the following formulations, however, lies in their
proven character. Most are taken from the Export Administration
Regulations or from similar regulatory programs. These have
proven to be workable and consistent with fundamental American
interests in closely related contexts. Other formulations, especially
those concerned with retroactivity, are designed to avoid the particular forms of extraterritorial regulation that provoked intense foreign
opposition during the pipeline episode.
The formulations discussed in subsections 1, 2, and 3 below are
intended to apply only to foreign policy controls. Subsection 4 considers forms of foreign accommodation the United States might seek
in return for moderating its jurisdictional claims in the foreign policy
area. The feasibility of similar compromises applicable to national
security controls is explored in subsection 5.
1.

GeneralFormulations

a. Consultation Agreements
In recent years, agreements calling for consultation and forbearance in the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction have begun to
assume importance in antitrust enforcement. Similar arrangements
might have a salutary effect on the political controversy over extraterritorial trade controls.
The central document in the antitrust field is the 1979 Recommendation of the OECD Council Concerning Co-Operation
Between Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade (Recommendation). 235 The Recommenda234. Id. Generating such options could be the most significant contribution of the
study commission proposed herein.
235. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Recommendation of
the OECD Council Concerning Cooperation Between Member Countries on Restrictive
Business Practices Affecting International Trade, OECD Doc. C(79) 154 (final) (Oct. 5,
1979), reprintedin 2 W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUsT LAWS app.

C (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as OECD Recommendation]. The 1979 Recommendation is a combination and expansion of two earlier recommendations. See 2 W. FUGATE,
supra, at 344.
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tion states that a member country that is about to commence an
antitrust investigation or proceeding "involving important interests
of another Member country" should notify that country of its intentions in advance. 236 In this way, the affected country can transmit its
comments to or request consultations with the initiating country.237
Under the Recommendation, the initiating country should give "full
and sympathetic consideration" to such comments and particularly
to suggestions of alternate courses of action.238 The initiating country, however, retains "full freedom of ultimate decision. '239 Member
countries that engage in consultations should "endeavour to find a
mutually acceptable solution in the light of the respective interests
involved."24 The Recommendation, however, states that "cooperation should not, in any way, be construed to affect the legal positions
of Member countries with regard to questions of sovereignty, and in
particular, the extra-territorial application of laws concerning restrictive business practices ....-241
The United States has entered into several bilateral agreements
implementing the OECD Recommendation. An example is the 1982
cooperation agreement with Australia. 242 This agreement calls for a
slightly greater degree of forbearance than the Recommendation.
Each nation agrees that, during consultations, it will "earnestly" seek
to avoid possible conflicts with the laws, policies, and national interests of the other, by giving "due regard" to the sovereignty of the
other and to international comity. 243 In particular, the U.S. agrees to
give "fullest consideration" to the modification or discontinuance of
236. OECD Recommendation, supra note 235, at § I.l(a).
237. Id. at § .3(a).
238. Id. at § 1.3(b).
239. Id.
240. Id. at § 1.5.
241. Id, at final preambular para.
242. Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, United
States-Australia, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 10365 [hereinafter cited as United StatesAustralia Treaty]. See generally Current Development, The Australian-United States
Agreement on Cooperationin Antitrust Matters, 76 AM. J. INr'L L. 866 (1982); Note, A
ComparativeAnalysisofthe Eficacy ofBilateralAgreementsin .ResolvingDisputes Between
Sovereigns Arising from ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust Law: The Australian
Agreement, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 49 (1983).
The United States-Australia Treaty follows at least two other bilateral agreements that
are somewhat less extensive in coverage. See Joint Statement Concerning Cooperation
in Antitrust Matters, Nov. 3, 1969, United States-Canada, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 1305
(1969); Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June 23, 1976, United States-Federal Republic of Germany, 27 U.S.T. 1956,
T.I.A.S. No. 8291. A more formal agreement with Canada was reached in 1984. See
Memorandum of Understanding with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust
Laws, March 9, 1984, United States-Canada, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprintedin
21 I.L.M. 702 (1982).
243. United States-Australia Treaty, supra note 242, at art. 2(5).
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antitrust proceedings when they impinge on Australia's interests. 244
Under the agreement, however, neither side is required to modify its
conduct. 245
It would be relatively simple to adapt agreements such as this to
the export controls context. In that setting, however, the agreements
would constitute essentially unilateral American undertakings on
consultation and forbearance. Under the antitrust agreements, by
contrast, the American obligation to consider foreign interests when
instituting enforcement proceedings is balanced by the foreign
party's obligation to consider American interests when adopting economic policies with extraterritorial effects or when regulating firms
that engage in restrictive business practices. 246 If the United States
required similar balance in an export control agreement, the foreign
party would have to undertake a suitable commitment. An agreement linked to trade with a specific country or region, such as Eastern Europe, for example, could obligate the foreign party to give
advance notice of planned transactions and to enter into consultations on their implications. 247
In the end, however, even with symmetrical obligations, consultation agreements would be of limited utility. Although they would
help to defuse some international conflicts over extraterritorial regulation, 248 they would do little to reduce the commercial uncertainty
that such regulation creates. Still, consultation agreements would be
a useful first step toward more substantive international
accommodation.
b. An Anti-Evasion Rule
Preventing evasion is often given as the principal rationale for
extraterritorial trade controls. 249 By the same token, the possibility
of conduct that might be considered evasionary constitutes a major
244. Id. at art. 2(6)(b).
245. Id. at art. 4(2).
246. See, e.g., id. at arts. 1(1), 2(2), 2(4), 2(6). For an argument that even the Australian agreement contains a "basic imbalance" in favor of Australia, see Note, supra note
242, at 70-71.
247. Cf. Frost & Stent, NATO's Troubles with East-West Trade, 8 INT'L SECURITY
179, 196-97 (1983). Balance might be achieved in a more general agreement by obligating the foreign party to explain the basis of its objections to U.S. jurisdiction, to suggest
alternative modes of regulation, and to give "full and sympathetic consideration" in each
case to cooperating with the American controls.
248. See Dam Address, supra note 182, at 21. According to Dam, the United States is
"seeking to expand the practice of prior notice, consultation, and cooperation with foreign governments wherever regulatory, enforcement or investigative actions raise a danger of conflicts." Id. The statement did not, however, refer specifically to export controls.
249. See REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 160, at § 418 comment h, D. RoSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 7, at 62; John Brown Memorandum, supra note 19, at
22.
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obstacle to the elimination of such controls. 250 Accordingly, the
United States might be willing to agree to a jurisdictional rule that
would authorize it to regulate foreign transactions only to the extent
necessary to prevent and punish evasion of foreign policy controls on
exports from U.S. territory. There can be, however, many views on
what forms of conduct constitute "evasion." Thus an international
agreement would have to define the term. A relatively narrow definition, encompassing conduct that contains an element of deception,
should satisfy the fundamental interest of the United States in protecting the integrity of its laws. At the same time, such a definition
would minimize American interference with foreign sovereignty and
would virtually eliminate uncertainty over the applicability of U.S.
export controls to legitimate foreign transactions.
The 1983 House bill to amend and extend the EAA of 1979
adopts the first part of this approach. 25' It would limit the President's foreign policy export control authority to the regulation of
exports "from the United States," but would extend the application
of any control imposed under that authority to "any transaction or
activity undertaken with the intent to evade" the control. 252 The bill
does not, however, attempt to define "evasion." The U.S. anti-boycott law, on the other hand, which is part of the EAA, already
includes an anti-evasion provision, on which the language of the
1983 House bill appears to be modelled. 253 One can look to this statute and the regulations promulgated thereunder for guidance in
defining "evasion."
The anti-boycott law directs the President to promulgate regulations "prohibiting any United States person, with respect to his activities in the interstate or foreign commerce of the United States,"
from engaging in certain specified activities "with intent to comply
with, further, or support" certain foreign boycotts. 25 4 The statute
goes on to direct that the regulations exempt a second group of activities.255 It then ties the package together with an anti-evasion provision, under which the prohibitions of the statute apply to "any
transaction or activity undertaken, by or through a United States
person or any other person, with intent to evade" the statute or the
implementing regulations. 25 6 The regulations 25 7 specify several
250.
251.
252.
253.

See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
H.R. 3231, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 113(a)-113(b) (1983).
Id.
See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (Supp. V 1981).

254. Id. § 2407(a)(1).
255. Id. § 2407(a)(2). The exemptions are intended to permit compliance with the
primary aspects of foreign boycotts. See Marcuss & Richard, supra note 10, at 452-53.
256. Id. § 2407(a)(5).
257. 15 C.F.R. §§ 369.1-.8 (1983).

19841

EXPORT CONTROLS

forms of conduct that will be deemed to constitute evasion.2 58 Two
of these are relevant to major problem areas in the administration of
export controls.
i.

259
Reexports and Analogous Transactions

The boycott regulations define "evasion" to include the use of
"dummy corporations or other devices to mask prohibited activity. ....,,260 In one example, 26 1 the regulations describe a U.S. firm
that has been selling products to a boycotting country for a number
of years, regularly furnishing certain boycott documentation. The
firm realizes that, upon the effective date of the anti-boycott law, it
no longer will be permissible to provide that documentation. The
firm therefore "arranges to have all future shipments run through a
foreign corporation in a third country," which will supply the
required documentation. This arrangement constitutes evasion,
according to the example, because it is a "device to mask prohibited
activity" by the U.S. firm.262 The boycott regulations, it should be
noted, are concerned only with the activities of United States persons. 263 As a result, only the American exporter in this example is
said to have committed evasion. The actions of the foreign corporation are not subject to the prohibitions of the statute, even though
264
they were essential to the evasionary scheme.
Even an anti-evasion rule aimed only at American exporters
might be a worthwhile addition to the export control program. The
Export Administration Regulations already forbid American firms
from exporting goods or technology to a friendly third country "with
the knowledge" that they are to be reexported to a controlled destination. 265 A restriction of this sort would be needed whatever settlement might be reached on the issue of extraterritoriality. Certain
egregious transactions, however, might call for special treatment.
In 1982, for example, two American export brokers, Sakwa and
Carter, learned that the Soviet Union wished to acquire a diesel
258. Id. at § 369.4.
259. The term "reexports and analogous transactions" is intended to include
(1) reexports of goods and technology; (2) foreign exports of end products containing
U.S.-origin components; and (3) foreign exports of products manufactured using U.S.origin technology. The term could also include other analogous transactions. See supra
note 106 and accompanying text.
260. 15 C.F.R. § 369.4(e) (1983).
261. Id. at § 369.4 example (ii).
262. Id.
263. Id. at § 369.4(a).
264. The result might be different if the foreign corporation were a "United States
person," e.g., a foreign subsidiary of the United States exporter. See id; infra note 287
and accompanying text.
265. 15 C.F.R. §§ 374.1(b), 379.8(a)(2) (1983).
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engine assembly line for its Kama River truck plant.266 Exports of

these items had been restricted by the United States following the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 267 Sakwa and Carter planned to

enlist a European firm willing to act as a conduit for the illegal
export and to provide false documents showing it to be the ultimate
recipient of the equipment. Unfortunately for Sakwa and Carter,
the firm they approached for the scheme was operated by the U.S.
Customs Service. The two were indicted and pleaded guilty to crim268
inal violations of several provisions of U.S. law.

Schemes like this involve more than mere knowledge that the
buyers of exported goods intend to reexport them.269 They even
involve more than willfully exporting with such knowledge. 2 70 They

clearly constitute evasion, as envisioned by the anti-boycott rules,
and the existence of a separate offense of evasion, with a separate,
harsher penalty, could help to deter them.27 1 Deterrence of evasion-

ary schemes would become especially important if the United States
were to agree to limit its jurisdiction over reexports. In that situation, restrictions on exports from the United States both to controlled
destinations and to third countries surely would be tightened, and

schemes for routing transactions through apparently innocent firms
in friendly third countries would become one of the few ways to
2 72
carry out an illegal export.

266. See Former CIA Employee, Two Others Named in Kama River Complex Export
Indictment, 18 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY 553, 553-54 (1983).
267. 45 Fed. Reg. 30,617 (1980) (codified at 15 C.F.R. § 385.2 (1983)). See Moyer &
Mabry, supra note 3, at 41, 48, 68-69.
268. See Former CIA Employee, Two Others Plead Guilty to Kama River Sh69ment
Charges, 18 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY 886 (1983); CIA Veteran, Two Othersare Sentenced in
Export Control Case by U.S. Judge 19 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY 20 (1983).
269. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
270. "Knowing" violations of the EAA of 1979 are punishable by a fine of 5 times the
value of the exports involved or $50,000, whichever is greater, and/or imprisonment for
not more than 5 years. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(a) (Supp. V 1981). "Willful" violations are
punishable by a fine of 5 times the value of the exports involved or $1,000,000, whichever is greater, and/or imprisonment for not more than 10 years. Id. at § 2410(b).
271. There are, however, numerous offenses under which perpetrators of this sort of
scheme can be prosecuted. Sakwa and Carter, for example, were indicted for conspiracy
to defraud the United States of the proper operation of federal agencies, conspiracy to
violate the EAA, soliciting and counseling violations of the EAA, and wire fraud. Former CIA Employee, Two Others Named in Kama River Complex Export Indictment, 18

U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY

553, 553-54 (1983).

272. Already, the main route for illegal Soviet acquisitions of Western technology is
said to be "the purchase of sensitive equipment through dummy corporations in the
West." Vinocur, A Trailof Western Technology Is Followedto the K G.B. "sDoor, N.Y.
Times, July 25, 1983, at Al, col. 4, A6. Cf. Intelligence Community Report on Soviet
Acquisition of Western Technology, U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY 58, 60 (Apr. 13, 1982)
(describing Soviet methods for obtaining Western technology "through illegal trade
channels").
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The United States could, of course, impose such an anti-evasion
rule on American firms without international agreement. The issue
here is whether an agreement permitting the United States to apply
its anti-evasion rule to certain foreign firms as well would be a workable solution to the extraterritoriality dispute. If the United States
273 it
retained the authority to impose prospective reexport controls,
would seem largely unnecessary to supplement direct prohibitions
on reexport with an anti-evasion rule.274 If foreign policy controls
on reexports were disavowed by the United States, however, an
extraterritorial anti-evasion rule would be a valuable addition to an
otherwise purely territorial system.
The primary target of such a rule would be foreign firms that
took part in evasionary schemes mounted by American exporters
like Sakwa and Carter. Under a territorial approach to jurisdiction,
Sakwa and Carter still could be prosecuted for various offenses, perhaps including evasion, but the foreign firm that agreed to act as
conduit for their illegal export-or the foreign nationals who established a dummy corporation through which the export could be
routed-could not be charged with an illegal reexport. The same
boundary on American jurisdiction found in the boycott regulations
would limit the reach of United States export controls. 275
In many evasionary schemes, the foreign participants could be
penalized for making false statements in United States export licensing documents. 2 76 This has long been a way of reaching foreign
reexporters, 277 and it could still be used under a regime of territorial
jurisdiction. Such a provision might be sufficient to deter and punish
foreign participation in evasionary reexport schemes. An anti-evasion provision, however, would be useful in situations where the foreign buyer does not have to submit documentation. In addition, a
separate anti-evasion rule could help deter participation in certain
deceptive schemes, such as those involving the establishment of
dummy corporations, that make it difficult to identify and locate the
foreign principals responsible for the filing of false documents.
Finally, a separate offense of evasion applicable to foreign firms
273. "Prospective" reexport controls are those which are operative at the time of an
export from the United States, such that foreign purchasers are, or should be, aware of
them. See supra notes 67, 69 & 87 and accompanying text. In this context, "reexport
controls" includes controls on analogous transactions. See supra note 259.
274. Foreign purchasers could be subjected to a charge of evasion, in addition to illegal reexporting, however, if they utilized dummy corporations or other "masking"
devices, making the reexport transaction and its participants difficult to trace.
275. But see supra note 264 and accompanying text.
276. 15 C.F.R. § 387.5 (1983).
277. See, e.g., Wlliam Kurt Samuel Wallersteiner et al., 22 Fed. Reg. 1650 (1957)
(order denying export privileges in which false statements constitute independent violation and supplement charge of illegal reexporting).
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could in all cases provide an additional deterrent, beyond that of the
false documents rule, for participation in those evasionary schemes
that would present the most serious threat to the integrity of territorial export controls.
The anti-evasion rule outlined here would allow only a very
limited assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The general theme
of permitting regulation of foreign evasionary conduct, 278 however,
runs through other, broader formulations in this section.
It can be argued, for example, that every purchase of U.S.-origin goods or technology by a foreign firm that intends to reexport
them to a nation to which exports from the United States are at the
time prohibited is evasionary. Accordingly, some commentators
have characterized all prospective reexport controls as anti-evasion
mechanisms.279 The United States, however, regularly has asserted
jurisdiction to restrict reexports retroactively. 280 Whether or not
such controls are valid under international law, it is hard to characterize them as a means of dealing with evasion. Under one formulation discussed below, then, American jurisdiction would be limited
to the imposition of prospective reexport controls, consistent with
2 81
their role as anti-evasion devices.
Furthermore, even prospective American controls on reexports
apply to all foreign firms purchasing controlled goods or technology,
not only to those that at the time of purchase intend to reexport the
items to a proscribed destination. 282 In the absence of such an
intent-for example, when goods are purchased for inventory-it is
again difficult to characterize the transaction as evasion. Another
formulation discussed below would limit American jurisdiction to
283
conform to this understanding.
ii. Transactions of Controlled Foreign Corporations
The anti-evasion provision in the U.S. anti-boycott regulations
also classifies as evasion the diversion of specific purchase orders by
a U.S. parent company to its foreign subsidiary for the purpose of
complying with prohibited boycott requirements. 284 As with the prohibition against the use of dummy corporations just described, 285
this portion of the anti-evasion rule appears primarily, if not wholly,
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

See supra pp. 120-21.
See John Brown Memorandum, supra note 19, at 22.
See supra notes 23, 35 & 36 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 341-61 and accompanying text.
See 15 C.F.R. § 374.1(a) (1983).
See infra notes 333-39 and accompanying text.
15 C.F.R. § 369.4(e) (1983).
See supra notes 260-83 and accompanying text.
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concerned with the United States parent that refers the purchase
order, 286 not with the foreign subsidiary that carries out the transaction.287 This aspect of the rule could be carried over, virtually as it

stands, to the export controls context. In addition, the United States
could seek authority to control directly the activities of foreign subsidiaries that take over transactions "diverted" to them by their
American parents. Such an extension of jurisdiction might be
unnecessary, however, given the efficacy of regulation directed at the
parent.288
Application of an anti-evasion rule to American MNEs is more
troubling than its application to schemes utilizing dummy foreign
corporations because the rule has the potential of interfering with
legitimate operations of multinational firms. The anti-boycott rules
deal with this danger in two ways. First, they require a showing of
evasionary intent.289 This requirement makes it substantially more
difficult for the government to establish a violation of the anti-evasion regulation. Second, they explicitly approve certain MNE operations. The regulation states that "alteration of a [firm's] structure or
method of doing business will not constitute evasion so long as the
alteration is based on legitimate business considerations and is not
undertaken solely to avoid the application" of the anti-boycott
rules. 290 An example in the regulations describes a permissible alteration of a firm's method of doing business. A parent corporation in
the United States, which has manufactured products for sale to certain boycotting countries, "assesses" the requirements of the antiboycott rules and determines it can no longer make products for sale
to the boycotting countries. Instead, a controlled foreign subsidiary
(apparently acting independently of its parent) expands its facilities
so that it can service that market. These actions are said not to constitute evasion, even though the result is to place certain sales beyond
286. 15 C.F.R. § 369.4 example (viii) (1983). The example given in the regulations to
illustrate this portion of the rule describes a U.S. manufacturer that is about to receive
from a regular customer in a boycotting country a purchase order including documentation requirements with which it could not comply if, as usual, it filled the order from its
U.S. plant. To permit the documents to be supplied, the firm "diverts" the order to a
foreign subsidiary. Id. The example states that the diversion constitutes evasion, without mentioning the role of the subsidiary. Id.
287. There is a suggestion in another regulatory example, however, that the activities
of the foreign subsidiary might constitute evasion in appropriate circumstances. Id. at
example (vii). In that example, however, both parent and subsidiary are exonerated. See
also id. at § 369A(a) (no United States person may assist another United States person to
violate or evade the regulations).
288. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
289. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981); 15 C.F.R. § 369.4(a) (1983). In some
circumstances, evasionary intent is presumed from the nature of the party's conduct. See,
e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 369.4(d) (1983).
290. 15 C.F.R. § 369.4(e) (1983).
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the reach of the anti-boycott rules, because there was "a legitimate
business reason" for the actions of the two firms. 291 Presumably the
same result would obtain if a new subsidiary or other affiliate were
established, so long as the firm could demonstrate "a legitimate business reason."
Such an anti-evasion provision, adapted to the export control
context, would give the President power to deal with flagrant cases of
evasion-defined to include practices involving surreptitious conduct and an effort to disguise the true nature of a transaction-without conferring carte blanche authority to interfere with legitimate
MNE operations. The fundamental risks and costs of foreign direct
investment and technology licensing could be relied upon to deter
292
wholesale foreign sourcing.
c. Contract Sanctity
Both the House 293 and the Senate 294 bills to extend and amend
the EAA of 1979 include so-called "contract sanctity" provisions. In
general, under these provisions newly imposed foreign policy export
controls could only restrict export sales of goods or technology contracted for after the imposition of the controls; transactions previously agreed upon would not be curtailed. The provisions in these
two bills are designed primarily to protect the reputation for reliability of exporters in the United States. 295 A negotiated contract
sanctity provision, however, could do much to limit the adverse
effects of extraterritorial regulation by insulating foreign transactions
from retroactive interference. Such a rule might give protection in a
number of situations.
1. A contract sanctity provision could protect foreign buyers of
American goods, components and technology from retroactive reexport and product of technology controls, perhaps the most offensive
feature of the 1982 pipeline regulations. 296 This aspect of contract
291. Id. at example (vii).
292. See supra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
293. H.R. 3231, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 111(a) (1983). "Any export controls imposed
under [section 6 of the EAA of 1979, the authority for foreign policy export controls]
shall not affect any contract to export entered into before the date on which such controls
are imposed .... I"d.
294. S. 979, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(2), 130 CONG. REc. S2252, S2254 (daily ed. Mar.
2, 1984). "The President may not, under [section 6 of the EAA of 1979], prohibit or
curtail the export or reexport of goods, technology, or other information in performance
of a contract or agreement entered into before the date on which the President notifies
Congress of his intention to impose controls.... ." Id.
295. See H.R. REP. No. 257 pt. 1,98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1983); S. REP. No. 17, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1983).
296. See supra notes 35-37, 69 & 83-87 and accompanying text.
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sanctity is more fully discussed below. 297 It should be noted here,

however, that a broadly phrased contract sanctity provision that did
not explicitly grant protection to foreign transactions might fail to
achieve the desired goal.
The 1983 House bill, for example, would protect only those
transactions undertaken in performance of a prior "contract to

export. '298 The bill specifies some of the transactions the term "contract to export" is intended to cover, but gives no indication whether

any foreign transactions are to be included.299 One might conclude
that foreign export contracts do not fall within the provision because
the House bill also would limit the President's authority to impose

300
foreign policy export controls to exports from the United States.
It is not completely clear, however, that this provision would pro301
hibit controls on reexports and analogous transactions.

If the term "contract to export" were interpreted to mean "con-

tract to export from the United States," some foreign transactions
might possibly be brought within its scope. For example, if an

American firm and a foreign licensee entered into a multi-year technology license at a time when no restrictions on sales of the products
of the technology existed, freedom from such restrictions might be

considered an implied term of the contract to export technology, and
as such would be entitled to protection. If the contract called for
nothing more than the delivery of goods or the disclosure of information and payment of the purchase price, however, no "contract to

export" would exist once the sale had been completed.30 2 In such a
case, the House provision respecting existing contracts would not
prevent the imposition of new restrictions on the exported goods or
303
technology.
297. See infra notes 341-61 and accompanying text.
298. H.R. 3231, supra note 293, at § 111(a).
299. Id. "[Tihe term 'contract to export' includes, but is not limited to, an export sales
agreement and an agreement to invest in an enterprise which involves the export of
goods or technology." Id.
300. Id. at § 113(a). See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
302. According to Ellicott, if foreign businesses expected retroactive product of technology controls to be imposed in the future, one response might be to cast purchases of
United States technology as "one-shot" sales, rather than as licenses. Ellicott, supra note
23, at 33. The aim would be to place the transaction outside the three conditions used as
the basis for regulating licensees in the 1982 pipeline regulations. See supra note 37 and
accompanying text. There seems to be no reason, however, why the United States could
not assert jurisdiction over sales of the products of technology previously exported in a
one-shot transaction, just as it does over reexports of goods previously exported in such a
transaction. If the analysis in the text is correct, then, the effect of a contract sanctity
provision would be to cause more technology transfers-and indeed transfers of goods as
well-to be cast as long-term contracts.
303. Difficulties could arise, however, in drafting a contract sanctity provision so as to
protect foreign reexporters. For example, consider a provision that defined a foreign
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2. A contract sanctity provision could protect foreign licensees
of technology and purchasers of plants and capital equipment from
the effects of newly imposed restrictions on exports from U.S. territory. For example, even if a foreign licensee could freely export the
products of its U.S.-origin technology, without additional protection
the United States would remain free to restrict exports from its territory of parts or know-how critical to the successful use of the
licensed process. 3° 4 A contract sanctity rule could prevent such indirect retroactivity as long as the subsequent obligations of the United
States supplier were included in the original contract.
3. A contract sanctity provision could provide the same level
of protection for controlled foreign subsidiaries as for domestic
firms. Neither the Senate nor the House bill, however, indicates
whether transactions of foreign subsidiaries are intended to be
3
covered. 05

In sum, a contract sanctity rule could eliminate the retroactive
effects of most extraterritorial trade controls, and go far to defuse the
controversy over extraterritoriality. A negotiated contract sanctity
rule, however, would only be effective if it specified much more
clearly than either of the provisions approved by Congress the exact
classes of foreign transactions to be protected.
As a means of resolving the dispute over extraterritorial jurisdiction, moreover, the approach has a more fundamental weakness.
Even a precise contract sanctity rule would leave the difficult questions of national jurisdiction unanswered, to arise again in situations
not covered by the rule: (1) all prospective extraterritorial controls;
(2) in the case of controls on reexports and analogous transactions,
any retroactive controls imposed on foreign buyers of U.S.-origin
goods and technology that have not entered into resale contracts;
(3) any classes of retroactive control exempted from the contract
sanctity provision; 306 and (4) any retroactive controls imposed under
firm's contract to sell U.S.-origin goods to a customer in a third country as a "contract to
export" entitled to protection. If a foreign firm entered into a resale contract before
purchasing U.S. goods to be delivered thereunder, the firm could argue that its purchases
in the United States should be exempt even from prospective reexport controls, since
such controls would interfere with its prior contract. This problem could arise under the
contract sanctity provision in the 1983 Senate bill, see supra note 294 and accompanying
text.
304. The General Electric Manufacturing Associates were in a similar situation after
the 1981 pipeline regulations. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
305. See H.R. 3231, supra note 293, at § 111(a); S. 979, supra note 294, at § 6(2).
306. The House bill, H.R. 3231,supra note 293, at § 111(a), excludes controls imposed
for several substantive foreign policy purposes from the contract sanctity provision. A
negotiated contract sanctity rule would presumably exclude national security controls,
permitting the President to escape the strictures of the rule by classifying particular regulations as national security controls. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
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authority exempted from the provision, such as the President's emergency powers. 30 7 A more lasting solution to the extraterritoriality
dispute would be achieved through negotiations that directly
addressed the issues of jurisdiction.
2
a.

FormulationsApplicable to Controls on Reexports and
Analogous Transactions
Licensing of De Minimis Transactions

The application of American reexport controls to U.S.-origin
parts, components and materials incorporated into final products
30 8
abroad is particularly irritating to foreign firms and governments.
The inclusion of a single U.S.-origin component can subject a foreign-manufactured end product to reexport restrictions, even if the
component is not the principal element of the product. 30 9 In implementing certain foreign policy embargoes, however, the United
States has responded to foreign pressure by relaxing this rule in cases
where the component is a relatively minor part of the product. A
similar policy could easily be implemented in all foreign policy
export controls.
The United States first introduced a de minimis exception in
1975.310 Responding to criticism of its trade embargo with Cuba, the
United States announced a change in its licensing policy on reexports. The new policy reflected the position of the Organization of
American States that each member state should be free to determine
its own trade policy toward Cuba. 31 1 It provided that, if local law
required or local policy favored such trade, the Office of Export
Administration would favorably consider requests by exporters in
Latin American countries to export to Cuba nonstrategic goods that
included only "an insubstantial proportion of U.S.-origin materials,
parts, or components ....-312 U.S.-origin content would be considered "insubstantial" if it amounted to less than 20% of the value of
the end product. 31 3 The Office of Export Administration also would
consider reexport authorization requests for products containing a
higher percentage of U.S.-origin content, but approval was "less
307. A negotiated contract sanctity rule might be limited to controls imposed under
the EAA. Cf.supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text (limitation of proposed moratorium to controls under EAA).
308. See supra notes 24-25, 35 & 68-69 and accompanying text.
309. 15 C.F.R. § 376.12 (1983).
310. See U.S. Takes Steps to Conform With OASAction on Cuba, 73 DEP'T ST. BULL.
404 (1975).
311. See 15 C.F.R. § 385.1(b)(2) (1983).
312. Id.
313. Id.
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likely." 314

The U.S. embargo on goods earmarked for use by the South
African military and police was modified in 1982 to incorporate a
similar policy.31 5 The embargo regulations require prior approval

for the use of U.S.-origin components, parts, and materials in the
foreign manufacture of controlled end-products when the manufacturer has reason to know that the products will be sold to or used by
the South African military or police. 316 Exports of such foreign-produced end products will be approved, however, if the U.S.-origin
components constitute 20% or less of the value of the final product. 31 7 The United States adopted the same policy as part of the

expanded embargo of Libya instituted in March 1982.318
The 20% de minimis rule has been a feature of the Cuba
embargo for eight years. It was explicitly adopted to alleviate concern over U.S. reexport controls among Cuba's traditional trading
partners. It apparently has succeeded in accomplishing that task.
The fact that the rule has been incorporated into other foreign
embargoes demonstrates that it is workable. Thus, some form of de
minimis rule deserves serious consideration as a general limitation
on the extraterritorial application of U.S. export controls. The de
rinimis rules used heretofore have been only statements of licensing
policy, not retractions of the American claim of jurisdiction to regulate reexports. Nonetheless, as a practical way of easing foreign concern over extraterritoriality, a de minimis rule may have merit.
b. A "Coming to Rest" Rule
The memorandum of law filed by John Brown Engineering
Limited (John Brown),319 one of the General Electric Manufacturing
Associates, in its effort to overturn the temporary denial order
entered against it for violation of the 1982 pipeline regulations, 320
suggests a formulation that would retract U.S. jurisdiction over reexports and analogous transactions. Under that formulation, Ameri314. Id.
315. See 47 Fed. Reg. 9201-06 (1982) (codified at 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a), Supp. No. I to
§ 399.1 (1983)).
316. 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a)(4) (1983) (modified by 48 Fed. Reg. 3360-61 (1983)).
317. See 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a)(5)(v) (1983). In fact, the new South African licensing
policy goes even further. It contemplates approval for (i) reexports of "insubstantial
portions" of U.S.-origin commodities and technical data, even if they are not incorporated into foreign-produced end products, and (ii) sales to military and police entities of
"insubstantial portions" of South African-produced direct products of U.S.-origin technical data, if,
in all cases, the commodities, technical data, or direct products will not "contribute significantly to military or police functions." Id. at § 385.4(a)(5)(vi).
318. 15 C.F.R. § 385.7(a)(2)(i)(C) (1983).
319. John Brown Memorandum, supra note 19.
320. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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can jurisdiction over exported goods-and, by extension,
technology-would terminate when the goods have "come to rest"
32
abroad. 1

American constitutional law applies a "coming to rest" test in a

related setting. Under both the Import-Export Clause 322 and the
Commerce Clause 323 of the Constitution, whether a state may val-

idly apply a non-discriminatory ad valorem property tax to imported
goods depends upon whether the goods have come to rest in the state

they are still in the stream of
at the time the tax is levied or whether
3 24
international or interstate commerce.

The coming to rest concept in this setting functions negatively to
prevent a state from taxing foreign-origin goods that are merely
passing through its territory without benefiting materially from its
services. 325 Taxation of such goods by a transit state would
adversely affect both consumers in the state of destination and the

free flow of trade.326 In the export controls context, the exporting
state has a more substantial set of connections with the exported

goods-and hence a more substantial claim to jurisdiction over
them-than a mere transit state, whose contact is purely fortuitous.

This is particularly so in the case of prospective reexport controls, of
which buyers are likely to be aware or to which they may even agree.
Still, the negative function of the coming to rest concept in constitu-

tional law suggests the appropriateness of limiting the ability of one
state to burden both the independent economic transactions of

another state and the free flow of international trade because of a
temporary, albeit important, connection with the traded goods.

The coming to rest concept functions positively under the
Import-Export and Commerce Clauses to authorize states to tax

goods that have left the stream of commerce and become indistin321. John Brown Memorandum, supra note 19, at 22-23. John Brown's argument was
that the jurisdictional provision of the EAA of 1979 should be interpreted not to authorize the imposition of new restrictions on reexport once U.S.-origin goods "have come to
rest abroad in the hands of an independent foreign company." Id. at 23.
322. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
323. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
324. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 285-93 (1978) [hereinafter cited as J. NowAK] (whether the goods are imported in
interstate or foreign commerce, taxability in the state of destination turns on whether the
goods have left the stream of commerce). See also Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423
U.S. 276, 286 (1976) (nondiscriminatory property tax "imposed on imported goods that
are no longer in import transit" not objectionable in light of intent of Import-Export
Clause). Michelin overruled Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1872), which held that
imported goods remained exempt from state property taxes even after the termination of
transit if the goods remained in their original packages. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 301.
325. See J. NowAK, supra note 324, at 290-91.
326. See id; Michelin, 423 U.S. at 287-90.
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guishable from other goods within their jurisdiction. 327 In the export
controls context, the positive function of the concept suggests that,
once U.S.-origin goods have become, for example, French goodswhenever that can be said to occur-France should regulate them.
At that stage, significant American regulation is inappropriate.
John Brown actually espoused a weak form of the coming to
rest concept. 328 The firm was willing to concede that the United
States could properly impose prospective reexport controls on its
goods. 329 It argued, however, that if no reexport restrictions were in
none
effect at the time goods were exported from U.S. territory, 330
could be imposed once the goods had "come to rest" abroad.
Under a stronger version of the concept, both the authority of
the United States to impose new restrictions on the disposition of
U.S.-origin goods and technology and any restrictions imposed at
the time of export would terminate when the items left the stream of
international commerce and came to rest abroad. This version of the
rule would more drastically limit American jurisdiction. It would,
however, permit regulation of reexports and analogous transactions
in several important situations.
First, even such a strong coming to rest rule should be interpreted to allow regulation of the kinds of reexport transactions that
would be proscribed under an anti-evasion rule. 331 Goods sent to a
dummy corporation for transshipment to a controlled destination,
for example, should not be considered to have come to rest.
Second, the stronger version of the coming to rest rule would
permit the maintenance of reexport controls on U.S.-origin goods
that were moving in transit through the customs facilities of a foreign country, without entering either the customs or the export control jurisdiction of that country. Goods in that situation would not
seem to have "come to rest." The failure of European governments
to assert control over such onward movements of U.S.-origin goods
has been a long-standing problem in COCOM 332 and presumably
has been even more troublesome in the context of foreign policy
controls.
Third, even the strong form of the coming to rest concept might
be interpreted to permit at least prospective-and logically even ret327. See Michelin, 423 U.S. at 287-90.
328. See John Brown Memorandum, supra note 19, at 22-23.
329. Id. John Brown characterized the power to regulate reexports prospectively as
the "power to control evasion." Id. at 22.
330. Id. at 22-23.
331. See supra notes 259-77 and accompanying text.
332. See Hearings,supra note 153, at 392-93 (comments of Theodore L. Thau, former
Executive Secretary of the Export Control (Administration) Review Board).
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roactive-regulation of the disposition of U.S.-origin goods and
technology that are purchased with an intent to resell them to a controlled destination. 333 Like the other applications of the coming to

ret concept, this one depends on the definition given the term "coming to rest." John Brown, concerned with the facts of its own transaction,334 argued that goods acquired by a foreign firm solely for
inventory, and not with a view to filling a particular order, should be

deemed to have come to rest.335 In support of this position, John
Brown cited a 1977 Commerce Department interpretation of the

anti-boycott rules then in effect. 336 Under that interpretation, a controlled foreign subsidiary of an American corporation was not
required to report the receipt of a boycott-related request for infor-

of
mation if it planned to fill the order of the requesting country out 337
goods previously acquired from the United States for inventory.

In other words, goods acquired for inventory come to rest when

received, terminating the flow of U.S. commerce. 33 8 In drafting the

current anti-boycott regulations, however, the Department of Commerce specifically rejected this understanding of "coming to rest"

and implicitly adopted an even narrower definition. Under the antiboycott rules, U.S.-origin goods acquired for inventory come to rest
only if the foreign subsidiary further manufactures them or incorporates, refines or reprocesses them into another product. 339 This defi-

nition would allow significant American reexport controls to
continue. Which definition of "coming to rest" would best resolve
the export control controversy could only be decided by negotiation.
Like the de rinirais rule discussed above, these applications of

the coming to rest concept reflect the general understanding that
goods have no permanent "nationality. ' '34° When goods break their
original connection with the United States and become predomi-

nantly "foreign," it seems appropriate that American jurisdiction to
restrict their disposition should cease.
333. See supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text. Such a rule, of course, would
present difficult problems of proof.
334. John Brown Memorandum, supra note 19, at 4.
335. Id. at 18 n.18.
336. Id.
337. Id. The interpretation, in the form of a letter from then Secretary of Commerce
Eliott L. Richardson, appears in i. at Exhibit 5.
338. Under the anti-boycott law, only "activities in the interstate or foreign commerce
of the United States" are subject to regulation. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1).
339. 43 Fed. Reg. 3,508-09 (1978); 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(12) (1983). Cf. id.at
§ 369.1(d)(8). This definition echoes the test suggested by Chief Justice Marshall in an
early Import-Export Clause case. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 44142 (1827) ("[Wlhen the importer has so acted upon the thing imported, that it has become
incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost
its distinctive character as an import ... ").
340. See Marcuss & Richard, supra note 10, at 480-81.
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c. Renunciation of Retroactive Controls
The unprecedented retroactive application of the 1982 pipeline

regulations was the most offensive aspect of the controls. 341 It may
have been the major reason for the strong response of the European
342
governments.
Retroactive trade controls can be more damaging to foreign
firms and more disruptive of foreign economies than restrictions in
effect when U.S.-origin goods or technologies are purchased. The
harshest effects are on foreign buyers who already have contracted to
resell 343 U.S.-origin items to newly controlled destinations. 344 Such
firms may be forced to seek alternative sources of supply on short
notice and to pay premium prices. If there are no close substitutes
for the American items or if substitutes cannot be procured
quickly,345 the firms may not be able to cover timely or at all. Then,
depending upon the language of the applicable force majeure
clauses, 346 they may be exposed to claims for delay or breach of contract, and may find it necessary to breach contracts with other suppliers. 347 Such defaults damage the commercial reputation of the firms
and of their home states. Firms caught in this plight would receive
protection under an appropriate version of a contract sanctity
rule,348 as well as under a rule limiting retroactive regulation.
Less severe results may occur for foreign firms holding U.S.origin goods or technologies for future resale-or for the manufacture of products for future resale-without a resale contract. Such
firms are less likely to incur out-of-pocket losses, but retroactive controls will still disrupt their commercial expectations and cut off possible avenues for resale. Firms in this situation might be aided by the
coming to rest rule, 349 but not by the contract sanctity approach. 350
341. See, e.g., supra notes 36-37 & 86-87 and accompanying text.
342. See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 3, at 112-13.
343. In this connection, the term "resell" includes pure resale contracts, the sale of
manufactured items incorporating U.S.-origin components, and the sale of items produced with U.S.-origin technology.
344. This was the position, for example, of the General Electric Manufacturing Assodates. See, e.g., John Brown Memorandum, supra note 19, at 4-5.
345. The timely availability of foreign substitutes became an issue after the December
1981 pipeline regulations. Alsthom-Atlantique had acquired the critical rotor manufacturing technology from General Electric before the controls were put into effect, so that
even as of early 1982 it would have been legally able to produce and supply rotors to
substitute for those that General Electric was by then forbidden to export. In fact, however, Alsthom would have had to construct a new plant in order to produce the required
quantity of rotors; hence, it would not have been a practical alternative source for some
time. See 3 A. LOWENPELD, supra note 3, ch. II, § 5.45.
346. See Fazzone, supra note 110, at 580-85.
347. Id. at 579.
348. See supra notes 296-303 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 319-40 and accompanying text.
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It should be recognized, however, that foreign buyers may be
able to protect themselves from both prospective and retroactive regulation by bargaining ex ante for a reduction in the price of their
U.S. purchases sufficient to cover the perceived political risk. Were
firms to do so, one would be less concerned about any losses they
might later incur, although subcontractors, workers and others
unable to bargain effectively still might suffer.
In some situations, ex ante bargaining would not be a realistic
possibility. If there were no ready substitutes for the American
goods or technology, bargaining would not be possible. 351 Even if
alternate sources were available, bargaining probably would not be
productive if the industry were oligopolistic and price discounts were
uncommon. In the case of prospective controls, however, the foreign
firm then could make a relatively informed decision 352 not to buy the
American goods or technology-planning not to bid on contracts
that would require their use, to design around the American components, or to turn to substitutes--or to proceed with the transaction
and assume the risk. When controls are retroactive, however, the
foreign firm does not have sufficient information to make a rational
decision. The firm may either underestimate or overestimate the
risk. Either way, its commercial activities and expectations are
disrupted.
Even when ex ante bargaining is possible, it will be difficult to
negotiate a price that takes appropriate account of the nebulous risk
of retroactive regulation. The foreign firm may overestimate the
risk, seek to pay too little, and be unable to strike a deal, or it may
underestimate the risk, pay too much, and suffer the full consequences if such controls are imposed.
Whether or not ex ante bargaining is possible, the adverse
effects on foreign firms will vary inversely with the information
available as to the likelihood of retroactive regulation. In the pipeline case, for example, some of the regulations in effect when the
affected foreign firms first purchased American goods and technology only ambiguously suggested the possibility of retroactive
353
regulation.
350. See supra notes 293-307 and accompanying text.
35 1. In this situation, Marcuss and Richard suggest that agreement by a foreign buyer
to American reexport restrictions would resemble a contract of adhesion. See Marcuss
and Richard, supra note 10, at 478.
352. The level of information available, however, would depend on the detail and
accuracy with which United States licensing policy were set forth. See Abbott, supra
note 14, at 794-98 (licensing policy typically described imprecisely or not at all in Export
Administration Regulations).
353. See supra notes 24 & 28 and accompanying text.
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Retroactive controls on reexports and analogous transactions

also can damage American economic interests. As previously discussed,354 the uncertainty created by assertions of jurisdiction to

restrict such transactions retroactively leads to a variety of risk-minimizing responses by foreign firms, all of which tend to disadvantage
American exporters.3 55 The risk-minimizing strategy just dis-

cussed, 356 bargaining ex ante for lower prices, also reduces the profits
of American exporters. Considering both these economic costs and

the hostility to retroactive regulation that foreign governments
demonstrated during the pipeline episode, one can easily conclude

that American renunciation of retroactive foreign policy controls on
foreign transactions would be desirable for all concerned.
An appropriate formulation of this policy can be produced by
generalizing John Brown's version of the "coming to rest" rule.35 7 It
consists of three parts. First, the United States should be authorized
to restrict the reexport of U.S.-origin goods and technology only if,
and to the extent that, reexport restrictions are in effect when they
are exported from the United States. Second, the United States

should be authorized to restrict the export of foreign-manufactured
goods incorporating U.S.-origin parts, components, and materials
only if, and to the extent that, such restrictions are in effect when the
U.S.-origin items are exported from the United States.3 5 8 Third, the

United States should be authorized to restrict the export of foreignmanufactured products based on U.S.-origin technology only if, and
to the extent that, such restrictions are in effect when the technology
is transferred from the United States. 359 The uncertainty in John
Brown's formulation caused by reliance on the "coming to rest" con-

cept3 60 could be avoided by omitting the concept completely. The
result would be precisely the formulation recommended by the
354. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
355. According to Ellicott, other adverse effects on American exporters may result
from the following strategies of foreign firms: (1) they may seek to narrow the scope of
force majeure clauses to place the risk of a supply interruption due to export controls on
the seller, (2) they may seek liquidated damages clauses triggered by such interruptions;
(3) they may insist on "sales" of technology rather than long-term licenses; and (4) they
may refuse to accept extended delivery schedules for goods. Ellicott, supra note 23, at
33-34.
356. See supra notes 351-53 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 328-30 and accompanying text.
358. This rule could be further modified by requiring that the U.S.-origin content be
"substantial," the "principal component" or the like.
359. In line with past practice, this rule might also require foreign licensees to give
"written assurances" against transfer of direct products to restricted destinations. See 15
C.F.R. § 379.4(f) (1983); supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 328-30 and accompanying text.
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American Bar Association in

1983.361

3. FormulationsApplicable to ControlledForeign Corporations
a.

Licensing of Non-Strategic Trade by Independent Foreign

Subsidiaries
The Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), 3 62 adminis-

tered by the Treasury Department, extend the jurisdictional reach of
the United States embargo of Cuba to controlled foreign corpora-

tions operating in third countries. 363 As with the prohibition on
reexports of U.S.-origin goods to Cuba, however, the United States
has relaxed its licensing standards for exports by such corpora-

tions.364 The current CACR provide that the Treasury Department

will authorize "independent" foreign subsidiaries or affiliates to con-

duct significant amounts of nonstrategic trade with Cuba.365 This
compromise licensing policy has defused the most heated opposition
366 It
to the extraterritorial application of the American embargo.

provides a promising model for a more widely applicable
formulation.
Like the policy governing reexports, the relaxed licensing stan-

dards for exports by third-country subsidiaries operate ony when the
law or policy of the state where the subsidiary does business requires
or favors trade with Cuba. 367 According to some commentators this

condition demonstrates "functional deference to the sovereignty of
the subsidiary's home state.' '3 68 Some foreign observers, however,
would find the degree of deference implicit in the standard less than

satisfactory. Commentators from the United Kingdom, for example,
361. See Report to the House of Delegates, supra note 180. The resolution adopted by
the House of Delegates recommends that the EAA of 1979 be amended to prohibit the
application of foreign policy export controls to "reexports from another country of U.S.origin goods and technology, or exports from another country of foreign-origin goods
that contain a principal component of U.S.-origin or that are based on U.S.-origin technology, unless controls existing at the time of the export of the U.S.-origin goods, components, or technology from the United States controlled such reexports or foreign
exports." Id. at 2.
362. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101-.809 (1983).
363. The prohibitions of the CACR apply to transactions undertaken by "any person
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b)(1) (1983). That
phrase is defined to include controlled foreign corporations. 31 C.F.R. § 515.329(a)(4)
(1983).
364. A relatively narrow exception for exports to Cuba by foreign subsidiaries was
included in the CACR from their imposition in 1963. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.541 (revoked
by 40 Fed. Reg. 41,108 (1975)); Thompson, supra note 10, at 328-31.
365. 31 C.F.R. § 515.559 (1983).
366. Indeed, in the late 1970's, opposition to the reach of the CACR came from those
in the United States who felt the embargo should be tightened to sanction Cuba for its
international activities. See Thompson, supra note 10, at 333-34.
367. 31 C.F.R. § 515.559(a) (1983).
368. See Marcuss & Richard, supra note 10, at 471.
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argue that a foreign state's laissez-faire policy should be entitled to
just as much deference as a policy of actively encouraging, or even
requiring, trade with a particular nation. 369 Still, the standard does
recognize a foreign state's interest in determining its own international economic policies, and it actually signals a retreat from the
"classical" United States position that deference will be given only to
a mandatory foreign law. 370 The United States might be willing to
grant an even higher level of deference as part of a general resolution of the extraterritoriality dispute.
Assuming that an appropriate local law or policy is in effect, the
regulations provide that licenses will be issued "in appropriate
cases" for exports to Cuba from U.S.-owned or controlled subsidiaries in third countries if several conditions are met. The principal
requirements are that the goods be manufactured abroad and be
"non-strategic, ' 371 that is: (1) not multilaterally controlled for
national security purposes; (2) not on the Munitions List; and (3) not
related to nuclear energy. 372 In addition, no U.S.-origin technical
data--other than information relating to the repair, maintenance or
operation of the exported equipment-may be transferred. The use
of U.S.-origin parts or components and the reexport of spare parts
must be licensed separately. No U.S. dollar account may be
involved in the transaction, and only normal trade credit may be
373
extended.
Beyond these technical requirements, a foreign subsidiary must
be "independent" to be eligible for a license. The regulations
require that the subsidiary be "generally independent, in the conduct
of transactions of the type for which the license is being sought, in
such matters as decisionmaking, risk-taking, negotiation, financing
. . . and performance." 374 A subsidiary will not be considered
independent "if there are a substantial number of officers or directors . . who are also officers or directors of a person within the
United States. '375 Furthermore, a license granted under the exemption does not authorize any "person within the United States" to par369. See, e.g., D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 7, at 57-58; Jennings,
ExtraterritorialJurisdictionand the United States Antitrust Laws, 1957 BRiT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 146, 151. A laissez-faire policy reflects not only a state's attitude toward trade with
particular nations, but also its attitude toward the proper role of government in its economy and society. By requiring affirmative state action, the CACR standard encourages
greater intrusion into the private sector by foreign governments.
370. See D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 7, at 57.
371. 31 C.F.R. § 515.559(a)(1)(i) (1983).
372. Id. §§ 515.559(b)-.559(c).
373. Id. at §§ 515.559(a)(1)(ii)-.559(a)(1)(vi) (1983).
374. Id. at § 515.559(c).
375. Id.
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ticipate in the transaction. 376 The regulations specify that
participation by a U.S. parent or any of its officers or employees in
will be a sufficient
the negotiation or performance of the transaction
377
license.
a
of
revocation
or
ground for denial
These required elements of independence are intended to prevent U.S. parent corporations from "evading" the embargo by working through their foreign affiliates. 378 In addition, however, the
independence test functions to limit U.S. regulation of foreign subsidiaries to cases where there are links between the subsidiaries and
persons clearly subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
beyond the single link of ownership or control. 379 This restraint substantially strengthens the remaining jurisdictional claim, suggesting
that the "independence" formulation could be given wider
application.
The CACR standard, however, is a very narrow one. In order
to adapt it to more general use, some of its technical requirements
would have to be relaxed. Variations could seemingly be made in
the eligibility requirements for a transaction. For example, the ban
on the use of U.S. dollars could be omitted. 380 Some of the more
specific elements of "independence," such as the limitation on overlapping officers and directors, also might be relaxed. 381 Furthermore, it might be possible to relax the prohibition against the
participation of any "person within the United States. ' 382 That
term, as defined in the CACR, includes any U.S. resident, wherever
located. 383 The participation of an independent, U.S.-based design
consultant, for example, need not subject an otherwise foreign transaction to American regulation. From the viewpoint of the United
States, the essential elements of the exemption are that the foreign
subsidiary is acting independently, i.e., not in league with its parent
376. Id.
377. Id. Under the original version of this exception, controlled foreign subsidiaries
were permitted to export to Cuba under general license, but all other persons subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States remained subject to the embargo and were forbidden
to participate in the subsidiary's transaction. 31 C.F.R. § 515.541(e) (revoked by 40 Fed.
Reg. 47,108 (1975)). See Malloy, supra note 202, at 507-09. The Treasury Department
adopted the view that American citizens serving as officers, directors or managers of
foreign subsidiaries were "participating" in their transactions merely by establishing a
corporate policy permitting authorized trade with Cuba. 31 C.F.R. § 515.412 (revoked
by 40 Fed. Reg. 47,108 (1975)). See Thompson, supra note 10, at 330-31.
378. Maloy, supra note 202, at 509.
379. Cf. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 10, at 471 (approach of CACR strengthens
jurisdictional claim of United States).
380. 31 C.F.R. § 515.559(a)(1)(v) (1983).
381. Id. at § 515.559(c).
382. Id.
383. Id. at § 515.330(a)(1).
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in an evasionary tactic, and that no strategic goods are involved.
Ancillary matters should be open to negotiation.
It must also be kept in mind that the CACR standard, like the
related policy on de minimis reexports, is only a statement of licensing policy, not a retraction of jurisdiction. 384 In fact, the policy by
no means guarantees approval of even those transactions that meet
all of its technical requirements; only "in appropriate cases" will a
license be issued. 385 To serve as a basis for resolving the extraterritoriality controversy, the independent subsidiary concept would have
to be transformed into a more nearly absolute determinant of the
limits of jurisdiction.
b.

Limitation of Jurisdiction to Activities in U.S. Commerce

The anti-boycott statute and its implementing regulations reach
only those activities of controlled foreign subsidiaries that are within
the interstate or foreign commerce of the United States.3 86 The regulations applying this principle are very complex and have been criticized as producing "unexpected" results. 3 87 The basic principle is
appealing, however, as a basis for compromise on American jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries.
The anti-boycott statute applies to "United States persons"including residents, nationals and domestic firms, as well as foreign
subsidiaries and other affiliates "controlled in fact" by domestic
firms---"with respect to [their] activities in the interstate or foreign
commerce of the United States ....",388 This term is often shortened to "U.S. commerce." For U.S. persons located in the United
States, activities in U.S. commerce are those that involve a "sale,
purchase or transfer of goods or services (including information)
between" two states of the Union or between the United States and a
foreign country.38 9 Similarly, for controlled foreign subsidiaries,
activities in U.S. commerce include any transaction with a person
located in the United States. 390 Determining when a controlled foreign subsidiary's transaction with a foreign party, such as a buyer in
a boycotting country, is in U.S. commerce is a more difficult problem. This is, however, the aspect of the jurisdictional rule that would
have to be adapted to the context of political export controls.
384. Cf. Thompson, supra note 10, at 330.
385. 31 C.F.R. § 515.559(a) (1983).
386. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981) ("with respect to his activities in
the interstate or foreign commerce of the United States"); 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d) (1983).
387. See Marcuss & Richard, supra note 10, at 450.
388. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
389. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(1)(i), (d)(1)(iv) (1983).
390. Id. at § 369.1(d)(6).
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It may be easier to address this issue by considering when foreign subsidiary transactions with third parties are not subject to regulation under the anti-boycott rules. First, transactions that do not
involve any purchase, sale or transfer of goods, services or information to or from a person in the United States are not activities in U.S.
commerce. 39 1 Thus, if a controlled foreign subsidiary carries on
business using only local or other foreign-source inputs, it will not be
subject to American regulation. Ownership or control, by itself, does
not bring the transaction within the jurisdiction of the United States.
A transaction between a foreign subsidiary and a foreign party
can involve some U.S.-origin goods or services and still remain
beyond the reach of the anti-boycott rules. If the transaction
involves the resale of U.S.-origin goods, the prohibitions of the statute will not apply if the foreign subsidiary acquired the goods without reference to a specific customer order and further manufactured
them or incorporated them into another product. 392 This is the
"coming to rest" test discussed above.393 In the situation described,
the regulations deem the flow of U.S. commerce to have stopped.
When U.S.-origin services are acquired by a controlled foreign
subsidiary, a similar rule applies. If the services are acquired without reference to a specific customer order, or are ancillary to transactions with foreign customers, subsequent transactions will not be
considered within U.S. commerce, even if the services helped make
them possible. 394 The first part of the rule on services does not
include an analogue to the requirement of further processing or
manufacture contained in the rule on U.S.-origin goods. 3 95 The
rationale for this omission, it seems, is that services are intangible,
and cease to exist once they have been performed. It is neither necessary nor possible to require the subsidiary to act further upon them
to ensure that the flow of U.S. commerce has stopped. The definition of "ancillary service" conforms to this interpretation. 396 Services provided for the subsidiary's own use, even in connection with a
customer transaction, are ancillary. Services provided to the subsidiary for the customer's use or benefit are non-ancillary. 397 For example, legal advice given by a U.S. person to a foreign subsidiary is an
ancillary service; it is rendered for the subsidiary's benefit. 3 98 In contrast, engineering services that are provided to the subsidiary in con391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.

Id. at § 369.1(d)(11).
Id. at § 369.1(d)(12).
See supra notes 334-39 and accompanying text.
15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(13) (1983).
See supra note 392 and accompanying text.
15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(14) (1983).

Id.
Id. at § 369.1(d) example (xi).
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nection with a construction project for a customer in a boycotting
country and are utilized by the subsidiary in preparing its drawings
are non-ancillary; they benefit the customer

directly.

399

In sum, if U.S.-origin goods or services flow directly through the
foreign subsidiary to its customers with relatively little change in
form, the transactions of the subsidiary are considered to be part of a
continuous stream of U.S. commerce. If,
however, the subsidiary
halts or changes the flow to a sufficient degree, the continuity of the
stream is deemed to be broken, and subsequent transactions by the
subsidiary will be free from regulation. In contrast to the general
400
"independence" test embodied in the Cuban embargo regulations,
this test benefits considerably from its reliance on relatively objective
and verifiable facts.
There remains considerable flexibility within the U.S. commerce test. Foreign subsidiaries could be given greater freedom
from regulation, for example, by the adoption of a more liberal definition of "coming to rest." The reach of the regulations also could
be expanded. Under the present rules, for example-in striking contrast with the pipeline regulations-the use of U.S.-origin manufacturing technology by a controlled foreign subsidiary will not bring401a
transaction between it and a foreign party within U.S. commerce.
Because of its flexibility, the meaning of "U.S. commerce" would
have to be clearly defined in any international agreement in order to
avoid dispute over its application. The initial ambiguity of the principle, however, may add to its value as a basis for negotiations.
c. Regulation Based on Agency
The applicability of American trade regulations to the activities
of controlled foreign subsidiaries sometimes depends upon whether
an agency, or alter ego, relationship exists between a U.S. corporation and a particular subsidiary. Such a relationship involves more
than mere ownership, more than ultimate control, and even more
than general management supervision. It requires actual direction of
the subsidiary's conduct or a similar level of participation by the parent in particular transactions of the subsidiary. Thus, the agency
approach has much in common with rules aimed at preventing
MNEs from evading American territorial controls by sourcing transactions through foreign affiliates. 402 In its emphasis on participation
by the parent, the agency approach also resembles the "indepen399.
400.
401.
402.

Id. at example (xii).
See supra note 374 and accompanying text.
15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d) example (vii) (1983).
See supra notes 284-93 and accompanying text.
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dence" rules of the Cuban embargo. 4°3 Regulations based on the
concept of agency, however, involve somewhat different formulations and provide an additional model for a negotiated settlement.
The 1980 American embargo of exports to the Soviet Union
related to the Moscow Olympics best exemplifies the agency con-

cept.4°4 The embargo regulations 405 did not apply directly to controlled foreign subsidiaries. Instead, they provided that any "person

subject to the jurisdiction of the United States '40 6 who "actually
authorizes, arranges, [or] directs" an export transaction by a foreign
subsidiary might be considered to have performed the transaction
itself and thus to have violated the embargo. 4°7 A parent corporation would not be found to have performed a transaction solely

because of its ownership interest in a foreign subsidiary----"actuar'
4 8
participation was necessary. 0
Under a rule of this sort, the parent's active participation is seen
as transforming the foreign subsidiary from a mere affiliate into an
agent. The subsidiary is no longer seen as acting in its own interest,
but rather as acting on its parent's "behalf and subject to [its] con'4
trol,"

9

or in other words as its parent's alter ego. Once such an

agency relationship is found, the parent can be held responsible
under basic agency principles for the consequences of the actions it
4 10
has set in motion.

The anti-boycott regulations follow a similar approach. They
provide that the act of a U.S. corporation in "specifically directing

the activities" of a controlled foreign subsidiary is an act within U.S.
commerce. 41 1 As a result, the regulations apply to the parent's direc-

tion even if there is no transfer of goods or services between parent
and subsidiary.4 12 The proposed regulations published in 1977
403. See supra notes 362-85 and accompanying text.
404. For a description of the embargo, see Moyer & Mabry, supra note 3, at 38-41.
405. 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(d) (1983) (revoked by 48 Fed. Reg. 3,360 (1983)).
406. 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(d)(3) (1983). In this regulatory scheme, "person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States" was defined not to include controlled foreign subsidiaries. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id See Thompson, supra note 10, at 353-54, 358.
409. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957).
410. Id. at § 212.
411. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(2) (1983). For the precise scope of the term "U.S. commerce," see supra note 388 and accompanying text.
There is a close resemblance between "specifically directing" a foreign subsidiary to
perform a transaction and "diverting" a purchase order to a subsidiary, conduct falling
within the anti-evasion provision of the boycott rules. See supra note 284 and accompanying text. The word "diverting," however, seems to imply an element of surreptitiousness and deception. In any case, the Olympics regulations went far beyond evasionary
conduct to reach even foreign subsidiary transactions "authorized" by the parent. See
supra notes 407-08 and accompanying text.
412. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d) example (vi) (1983).

148

CORNELL INTERN-ATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:79

would also have declared the foreign subsidiary's transaction with its
customer to be within U.S. commerce. 4 13 The final regulations, however, dropped this portion of the rule in response to numerous comments suggesting that it was unwise and unnecessary. 4 14 In adopting
the final regulations, the Department of Commerce noted that the
change was "immaterial" as a matter of policy.4 15 United States corporations could be satisfactorily deterred from acting through their
foreign subsidiaries by direct regulation; little would be gained by
regulating the subsidiaries themselves.
Recognized legal principles support the regulation of American
parent corporations under an agency approach. 416 American law is
applied only to entities that are indisputably of U.S. nationality.
The United States only regulates conduct-the giving of directionsthat takes place within its territory. It is true that such regulation
restricts the trade of foreign subsidiaries and affects foreign nations.
It is reasonable, however, for subsidiaries to expect that their activities may be restricted under U.S. law when they are carrying out the
directions of parent corporations in the United States. The agency
approach also minimizes intrusion into the sovereignty of foreign
host states. United States law restricts the activities of foreign subsidiaries only when they act as tools or extensions of American firms,
not when they carry on business as independent foreign entities.
Furthermore, the United States does not purport to apply its law
directly to foreign subsidiaries, although the same results may be
obtained indirectly. 417 With this degree of support in international
law, the agency approach might be a particularly fruitful basis for
negotiation.
The approach, however, does have certain drawbacks. One is
the difficulty that would be involved in identifying transactions that
fell within the rule. Proper identification would require not only a
steady flow of information on foreign subsidiary trade in restricted
products or with restricted destinations, but also a means of determining which transactions were directed or authorized by an American parent firm. Some inferences might be drawn from the
circumstances of particular transactions, but many cases might
require direct proof in the form of internal company documents.
413. Compare 43 Fed. Reg. 3,508-09 (1978) (final regulations) with 42 Fed. Reg.
48,560 (1977) (proposed regulations).
414. 43 Fed. Reg. 3,509 (1978).
415. Id.
416. Cf. Thompson, supra note 10, at 363-65 (discusses traditional principles of international law supporting regulation of controlled foreign subsidiaries).
417. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
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Another shortcoming of the approach is that, like an anti-evasion rule, it could be interpreted expansively by the United States to
support the regulation of MNE transactions far outside the limited
range of conduct originally contemplated. 418 Therefore, an agreement that incorporated the agency approach might have to delineate
permissible types of parental involvement. For example, an agreement could narrow the Olympics embargo regulation somewhat by
providing that a parent corporation would be prohibited from actually "arranging or directing" a subsidiary's transaction, but would
not be prohibited merely from "authorizing" it.419
More broadly, the ability of the United States to restrict the conduct of foreign subsidiaries by regulations addressed to parent corporations or American nationals serving as officers, directors or
managers of subsidiaries 420 will have to be addressed in any negotiated settlement retracting U.S. jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries.
In most past episodes, 421 even when American trade regulations
have expressly applied to transactions by foreign subsidiaries, the
United States has chosen to order American firms to direct their foreign subsidiaries not to enter into certain transactions. 422 This was
the approach followed, for example, in the well-known Freuhauf
case. 423 More importantly, in a number of cases the United States
has purported to free foreign subsidiaries from direct regulation, but
has in effect read the resulting exemptions out of the regulations by
means of rules restricting participation by parent corporations or
American nationals.4 24 Informal pressure may also be placed on

parent corporations to induce them to restrict their subsidiaries'
activities. For example, while the regulations imposing a trade
embargo on Iran during the hostage crisis did not apply to foreign
subsidiaries, they required parent firms to notify the U.S. government in advance of any proposed transactions between their subsidiaries and Iran.425 According to most commentators, the purpose of
426
this rule was to permit "arm-twisting" of the American parent.
This approach, in contrast to the agency rule considered
above,427 focuses on the potential agency relationship between par418. See supra notes 289-91 and accompanying text.
419. See 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(d)(3) (1983). Lesser degrees of involvement, see, e.g., supra
note 377, should also be expressly permitted.
420. See Thompson, supra note 10, at 357-58.
421. See, eg., supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
422. See Berman & Garson, supra note 1, at 868.
423. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
424. See Thompson, supra note 10, at 357-59.
425. 31 C.F.R. § 535.206(b), .207(b), .603 (1980) (revoked by 46 Fed. Reg. 14,337

(1981)).
426. See Ellicott, supra note 60, at 551-52; Thompson, supra note 10, at 360.
427. See supra notes 402-19 and accompanying text.
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ent and controlled foreign subsidiary. It uses that relationship to
extend the reach of American law, even beyond the express scope of
the relevant regulations. The United States again appears to be on
strong jurisdictional ground in this "easy circumvention" of the difficulties faced in asserting direct jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries. 428 The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, for
example, approves of it,429 because the application of United States
law is limited to American nationals and American territory. 430
Whatever its legality, however, the practice of indirect regulation has
the same economic effects as direct regulation of foreign subsidiaries.
The reaction of foreign countries, moreover, is likely to be equally
negative. 431 If the United States were to retain broad authority to
regulate foreign subsidiaries indirectly, it could undermine any compromise limiting extraterritorial regulation.432
4. Foreign Accommodations

Implementation of any of the foregoing formulations would
involve a significant retraction of the reach of American export controls. An important issue in any international negotiation based on
such formulations would be the nature and extent of the foreign
accommodations that the United States should seek in return.
In considering this issue, one must first recall that the benefits of
limiting extraterritorial regulation would enure to the United States
as well as to its trading partners. 433 In addition, one must bear in
mind that the value of the regulatory jurisdiction that the United
States would surrender is not as great as it may seem: political trade
controls generally have had only limited success, 434 and extraterrito-

rial controls, in addition to creating the political and economic costs
previously described, 435 are subject to blocking actions by affected
foreign governments. 436 In light of these considerations, the interests
of the United States might be well served if it obtained only two
foreign concessions: mutuality of agreement and a pledge of noninterference with permissible controls.
428. Thompson, supra note 10, at 365.
429. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 27 comment d (1965).
430. Cf. supra note 416 and accompanying text.
431. See Thompson, supra note 10, at 339.
432. Cf. D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIoHTON, supra note 7, at 59-60.
433. Those benefits consist of reductions in the political and economic costs described
above. See supra notes 107-30 and accompanying text.
434. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
435. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 107-30 and accompanying text.
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a. Mutuality
The United States should insist that any limitations placed on
its extraterritorial jurisdiction apply equally to the other states party
to the agreement. Except for the Arab boycott of Israel,4 37 no foreign government has yet made a significant threat to impose political
restrictions on reexports, sales by subsidiaries, or other transactions
originating within the United States. The requirement of mutuality,
however, is not merely a matter of formal symmetry. With rising
levels of trade and foreign direct investment in the United States, it
may be only a matter of time before an aggressive foreign government is tempted to impose the sort of extraterritorial trade control
that it previously has seen fit to condemn.4 38 A requirement of
mutuality would prevent such an escalation in the extraterritoriality
dispute.
b. Non-interference with Permissible American Controls
The United States also should insist that each foreign government party to a negotiated settlement pledge not to use blocking statutes, such as the British Protection of Trading Interests Act,439 other
legal devices, or informal pressure to interfere with forms of extraterritorial regulation permitted under the agreement. For example, if
the United States were to agree to abandon retroactive reexport and
product of technology controls, foreign governments should pledge
not to block prospective controls. This pledge would also have to be
reciprocal, under a general requirement of mutuality.
An international agreement including these two elements would
be an exemplary exercise in principled negotiation. 440 The agreed
allocation of national jurisdiction would reflect the shared interest of
all parties in reducing international political strife and increasing
certainty for international trade and investment. All of the formulations discussed herein reflect the primacy of the territorial state's
interest in regulating economic activity taking place within its
boundaries. At the same time, the mutual pledge of non-interference
with permissible controls would reflect the interest of every state in
regulating conduct aimed at evading its laws-the other common
theme of most of the formulations discussed in this section. The
resulting agreement would be balanced and beneficial to all sides.
437. For a description of the Arab boycott and its effects on firms in the United States,
see 3 A. LOWENFELD, supra note 3, at ch. lI, §§ 1-2.46.
438. See Soviet-European Gas Pipeline: HearingBefore the Subcomnm. on International
Economic Policy of the Senate Comm. on ForeignRelations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41
(1982) (statement of Douglas E. Rosenthal).
439. See supra note 45.
440. See supra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
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While mutuality of agreement and a pledge of non-interference
might be adequate consideration for an American agreement limiting extraterritorial jurisdiction, other concessions might also be
desirable.
c. Cooperation with American Controls
The United States could request foreign governments to go further than simply pledging not to interfere with permissible controls
and agree to cooperate actively in enforcing the forms of extraterritorial regulation permitted under the agreement. One useful form of
cooperation would be publicizing the terms of the agreement, particularly the situations in which American controls could still be
applied. Such publicity would help create the desired climate of economic certainty, and would limit the number of cases in which foreign firms could claim surprise at the application of American law.
Another valuable form of cooperation would be assistance in
obtaining the information needed to implement permissible forms of
regulation, particularly in the area of reexport and product of technology controls. For example, foreign governments might agree to
cooperate in gathering information on: (1) dummy foreign corporations or foreign nationals suspected of participating in evasionary
schemes; (2) the amount of U.S.-origin content included in foreignmanufactured products; or (3) the status and dates of commercial
contracts potentially affected by American controls.
The 1982 agreement between the United States and Australia
on cooperation in antitrust matters includes a provision similar to
that just suggested. 441 Under that agreement, when a proposed antitrust investigation or enforcement action under the law of one
party-typically the United States-does not adversely affect the
national interests of the other party, the latter will cooperate by, inter
alia, providing "information and administrative and judicial assistance to the extent permitted by applicable national law." 442 The
exact kinds of administrative and judicial assistance that might be
desirable in the enforcement of American export controls and permissible under foreign law are matters beyond the scope of this Article. They would, however, be appropriate questions for the study
commission proposed above.
441. See United States-Australia Treaty, supra note 242, at art. 5(1). The agreement
also includes an undertaking not to interfere with United States efforts to obtain needed
information. Id. at art. 5(2).
442. Id. at art. 5(1).
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d. Substantive Consultations
The United States also could seek agreement on consultations
concerning the substantive foreign policy issues underlying the use
of export controls. 443 As Deputy Secretary of State Dam recently
has noted: "When . . . disputes over jurisdiction turn out to be

grounded in disputes over policy, the most effective solution is a
444
major effort to harmonize our policies."
Two types of consultation mechanism could be established.
First, foreign governments might agree to notify the United States of
proposed transactions with the Soviet Union or other politically sensitive countries. The resulting consultations would be aimed at
avoiding the sort of unilateral American actions seen in the pipeline
episode. Alternatively, or in addition, the United States might be
required to initiate consultations when considering the use of extraterritorial political export controls. 445 Such consultations might help
remove a significant irritant in past episodes of American regulation.44 6 They also would provide the United States with an opportunity to persuade foreign governments to adopt its view of the
underlying issue and initiate parallel economic sanctions. Such
efforts might produce limited results, but they could hardly do less
than past efforts to obtain international cooperation. 447
e. Cooperation with National Security Controls
In an international negotiation, it would of course be possible to
cross agendas and seek foreign accommodations on matters other
than foreign policy export controls. It would seem to be a natural
compromise, for example, for key foreign governments to agree to
strengthen the coverage and enforcement of multilateral controls on
products and technologies with military applications in return for
limitations on the reach of American foreign policy controls. Negotiations to strengthen multilateral controls are called for by both the
44
Senate and the House bills to extend the EAA of 1979. s Such
443. Compare the joint studies of East-West economic relations, particularly in the
energy field, begun by the Western allies as part of the "plan of action" agreed upon
contemporaneously with the lifting of American pipeline sanctions in November 1982.
See East-West Trade Relations, supra note 55; supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
444. See Dam Address, supra note 182, at 16.
445. Under the House bill to extend and amend the EAA of 1979, the President would
be required to consult with the member states of COCOM and other appropriate foreign
governments before imposing foreign policy export controls. H.R. 3231, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 110(d) (1983).
446. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
447. See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 3, at 144-46; Abbott, supra note 14, at 808.
448. H.R. 3231, supra note 293, at § 107 (1983); S. 979, supra note 294, at § 5(25).
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negotiations could be coordinated with the discussions on foreign
policy controls suggested in this Article.
5. NationalSecurity Controls

The compromise formulations described in this Article have all
dealt with foreign policy export controls. A number of considerations justify excluding national security controls from the discussion
thus far.
First, national security controls have been applied extraterritorially with more restraint than at least the most expansive political
restrictions:
(a) Sales by controlled foreign subsidiaries not involving U.S.origin goods or technology historically have been regulated by the
Treasury Department under the Transaction Control Regulations. 449
Those regulations apply to every "person within the United
States, ' 450 a term defined to include controlled foreign subsidiar-

ies.451 They require that any such person obtain a license for a transaction involving the shipment of multilaterally controlled strategic
merchandise from a foreign country to the Soviet Union or other
controlled Communist destinations. 452 The regulations automatically authorize, however, any otherwise restricted transaction that
originates in and is licensed by one of the member nations of
COCOM. 45 3 Thus, as a practical matter, American national security
controls do not intrude on the COCOM countries' power, based on
territorial sovereignty, to regulate controlled foreign subsidiaries
even though those nations are the most important hosts for American foreign investment. 45 4
(b) The Export Administration Regulations do restrict, for
national security purposes, exports to Communist nations of foreignproduced direct products of U.S.-origin technology. 45 5 These restrictions, however, have only been applied prospectively in cases where
the foreign licensee has given a written assurance that he will not
export the controlled products to proscribed destinations. 456
449. Transaction Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 505.01-.60 (1983). See Malloy,
supra note 202, at 510-11.
450. 31 C.F.R. § 505.10 (1983).
451. Id. at § 505.20; 31 C.F.R. § 500.330(a)(4) (1983).
452. 31 C.F.R. § 505.10 (1983).
453. Id. at § 505.31(a). This general license is not available for exports to Cuba or to
the nations embargoed under the Foreign Assets Control Regulations (31 C.F.R.
§ 500.101-.809 (1983)). 31 C.F.R. § 505.31(a)(1), .31(b).
454. See D. ErrmAN & A. STONEHILL, supra note 73, at 12.
455. 15 C.F.R. § 379.8(a)(3) (1983).
456. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
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(c) While reexport controls generally apply to all items controlled for national security purposes, since 1980 firms located in
COCOM countries have been permitted to engage in certain reexport transactions without obtaining the authorization of the United
States.457 The exemption covers reexports to Communist nations,
except those subject to an embargo, of most multilaterally controlled
strategic commodities originating in the United States if the sale is
made in accordance with the conditions of the license issued by the
local authorities and has been approved unanimously by
COCOM.458 Unlike the authorization for transactions by foreign
subsidiaries contained in the Transaction Control Regulations, this
exemption does not grant a foreign state discretion to approve transactions. The United States retains the power to block a proposed
reexport by exercising its COCOM veto. 459 At the same time, the
United States does cede primary licensing authority to the foreign
state, and exercises its influence through a multilateral institution,
not by the unilateral application of its domestic law.
Second, U.S. national security controls have had a relatively
moderate jurisdictional reach, because other Western governments
have agreed in principle with the need to limit Soviet access to strategic goods and therefore have maintained national control systems
roughly comparable to those of the United States. 460 As long as that
consensus continues, there is no pressing political need to limit the
reach of American national security controls.
Finally, in the current political climate, there is little likelihood
that the U.S. Government would agree to reduce the reach of its
national security controls. The Reagan Administration, in particular, is working to strengthen national security controls. 461 The
457. 15 C.F.R. § 374.2(i), .3(e) (1983).
458. Id. at § 374.3(e).
459. COCOM exceptions decisions must be unanimous. Id. at § 374.3(e)(v). See
Hunt, MultilateralCooperationin Export Controls-TheRole of COCOM, 14 TOLEDO L.
REv. 1285, 1292 (1983). The exception was recommended by President Carter on the
ground that the United States would have "already approved reexport of the same product as part of the COCOM process." President Carter's Recommendations to Congress
on Export Disincentives (Sept. 9, 1980), reprintedinU.S. EXPORT WEEKLY, at M-1, M-3
(Sept. 16, 1980).
460. See Special Report on Multilateral Export Controls, reprintedin Export AdministrationAct: AgendaforReforn HearingBefore the Subcomm on InternationalEconomic
Policyand Trade ofthe House Comma on InternationalRelations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52
(1978).
461. Two recent actions exemplify the Administration's efforts. First, in January
1984, the Office of Export Administration (OEA) proposed extensive changes in the regulations governing the issuance and use of Distribution Licenses. 49 Fed. Reg. 2264-67
(1984). The Distribution License is a special licensing procedure, widely used by major
American exporters, that authorizes multiple exports of certain commodities to foreign
consignees approved in advance by OEA as distributors or users. See 15 C.F.R. § 373.3
(1983). OEA also announced "an extensive program of audits of Distribution License
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Administration and both houses of Congress, moreover, have
expressed less than complete confidence in COCOM.4 62 Such confi-

dence is a precondition for further reductions in unilateral
regulation.
Nonetheless, it is worth briefly considering further reductions in
the duplicative reexport controls that have been the major irritants to

foreign governments in American national security controls. There
have been numerous proposals to eliminate the requirement that an
exporter in a COCOM country whose transaction involves the reex-

port of multilaterally controlled U.S.-origin goods or components
must obtain a reexport authorization from the United States as well
as an export license from his own country and an exception decision
from COCOM. In 1979, both houses of Congress considered proposals to prohibit reexport controls in this situation.463 Although the
House Foreign Affairs Committee approved one such proposal, 64
the EAA of 1979 did not deal with the issue. The President's Export
Council raised the subject again in 1980, and once more in 1982.465
It recommended a gradual relaxation of duplicative reexport con-

trols not only for COCOM countries but for any country that maintains an adequate export control system. 466 The Council's
recommendation was in two parts: (1) eliminate U.S. reexport conholders and consignees. .. ." 49 Fed. Reg. 2264 (1984). Both steps were said to be
designed to ensure that the Distribution License procedure "does not result in illegal
diversion contrary to U.S. national security." Id.
Second, in March 1984, President Reagan announced that the Department of Defense
(Defense) would be assigned additional functions in the administration of national security export controls. See 20 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY 784-86 (1984). Defense is generally
regarded as more conservative than the OEA in the administration of such controls. A
memorandum of understanding between Defense and the Department of Commerce will
allow Defense to review individual validated license applications for exports of specified
classes of commodities to several friendly countries. Id. Under the EAA of 1979,
Defense is authorized only to review proposed exports to controlled destinations. See 50
U.S.C. app. § 2409(g)(1) (Supp. V 1981). Once the procedure authorized by the memorandum of understanding has been implemented, Defense will participate in the Commerce Department's review of the Distribution License procedure. See 20 U.S. EXPORT
WEEKLY 784 (1984).
462. See supra note 448 and accompanying text; S. REP.No. 170, 98th Cong., Ist Sess.
11 (1983) ("A universal theme in the Committee's deliberations. . . has been the inadequacies of the multilateral effort to administer national security export controls.") For
criticism of COCOM by a representative of the Reagan Administration, see Hearings,
supra note 153, at 173 (statement of William Schneider, Jr., Under Secretary of State for
Security Assistance, Science and Technology) ("COCOM. . .has not always met the
challenge.
...
).
463. See H.R. 4034, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(i)(3), 125 CONG. REc. 24034 (1979); S.
REP. No. 169, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1979).
464. See H.R. RaP. No. 200, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1979).
465. See Subcommittee on Export Administration, President's Export Council, Findings and Recommendations on U.S. Unilateral Reexport Controls (Feb. 12, 1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 P.E.C. Report]; Subcommittee on Export Administration President's
Export Council, U.S. Export and Reexport Controls (Dec. 2, 1982).
466. 1980 P.E.C. Report, supra note 465, at 4-5.
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trols in cases where a reexport transaction has been approved unanimously in COCOM; and (2) eliminate such controls in cases where a
reexport transaction is in a class of transactions that the COCOM
governments have agreed to delegate to the licensing discretion of
the individual national authorities. 467 The reexport exception
described above,468 approved by President Carter in 1980, adopts the
first part of the Council's recommendation. The issue now is elimination of U.S. reexport controls in favor of foreign national
regulation.
The two proposals before Congress in 1979 were abandoned in
large part out of concern that, as drafted, they would have prevented
the President from reimposing reexport controls if such a step
became necessary. 469 This objection could be easily met, however,
by drafting the statute to require promulgation of a general license
for reexports from COCOM countries, subject to any exceptions that
the President or the Secretary of Commerce might proclaim from
time to time. Duplicative reexport controls would be eliminated, but
if the need were to arise, controls on reexports could be reinstituted
immediately for particular products or particular COCOM countries. This is essentially the approach followed in the Transaction
Control Regulations for foreign subsidiaries. 470 No reason is immediately apparent why the same approach could not be used for
reexports.
Limiting duplicative reexport controls in this way might be a
valuable negotiating proposal. The EAA of 1979 already directs the
President to negotiate with the COCOM nations for better enforcement procedures. 471 The Senate and House bills to extend and
472
amend that Act would prescribe new goals for those negotiations.
Neither the Act nor the bills, however, provide any incentives for
foreign nations to comply with the demands of Congress. Limiting
duplicative reexport controls would be an ideal quidpro quo for concessions of this sort by COCOM members.
467. Id. at 5.
468. See supra notes 457-58 and accompanying text.
469. See S. REP. No. 169, supra note 463, at 11. (Quoting letter from Department of
Defense: "[The export control practices of another country may not remain constant.
Yet under the proposed legislation we would have no legal remedy to respond to any
loosening of such controls until exports damaging to our national security had already
taken place.") Accord 125 CONG. Rnc. 24039 (1979) ("I do not believe that we should
prohibit ourselves from utilizing them if we feel it is necessary" (statement of Rep.

WolO)).

470. See supra notes 449-54 and accompanying text.
471. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(i)(4) (Supp. V 1981).
472. See supra note 448 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The extraterritorial application of U.S. export controls produces
political animosity among the nation's major trading partners, hampers American exporters of goods and technology and the foreign
subsidiaries of U.S.-based MNEs, distorts international trade and
investment flows, and reduces world economic welfare. Because of
fundamental developments in the structure of the world economy,
extraterritorial trade controls are likely to remain an issue for the
foreseeable future.
Almost any solution to the problems of extraterritorial regulation will require action, or at least considered inaction, by Congress.
This Article has outlined a procedure through which Congress could
address the problem of extraterritoriality without assuming the burden of precisely defining the reach of American jurisdiction, a task
for which it is institutionally ill-suited. Under this proposal, Congress's role would be that of catalyst, acting to precipitate action by
the executive branch aimed at resolving the international political
controversy over extraterritoriality and restoring certainty to international trade. International negotiations, based upon a thorough
study of the problem and the available alternatives, are the most
likely means of achieving these goals. This Article has suggested a
number of compromise formulations, most of which have been used
in similar regulatory programs, that could serve as bases for a negotiated agreement.
Whether the United States adopts the precise approach recommended here is of little consequence. What is essential is that the
present opportunity to resolve the extraterritoriality dispute in the
sensitive area of export controls not be allowed to slip away.
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